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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
North Korea is considered to be one of the most closed and secretive nations on Earth.
The reasons for its isolationist identification are multifold, but can be best explained that after the
Korean War, 1950-53, the DPRK, founded by President Kim Il Sung, adopted a policy of
ostensible diplomatic and economic self-reliance, or Juche. Under this doctrine, strong military
posturing and dependence on national resources made for a self-imposed segregation from the
international community. North Korea maintains that it is still in a state of war, yielding in a
highly militarized area, where its Songun, or military-first policy, continues to isolate this
country from the world. The sensitivity of this situation creates an obscure vision of North
Korea. DPRK’s isolationist posturing can be demonstrated, for example, by denying economic
monitoring agencies access to vital national statistics. Verifiable information as to how North
Korea manages its finances and ultimately how DPRK manages to survive as a nation is coveted,
but withheld. The prevalence of academic research on this nation, in regards to domestic
analyses and relationships with the international community, are difficult to find.
Currently, the extent of academic knowledge of North Korea’s nuclear motivations are
primarily based on theoretical security disciplines (namely, rational deterrence and
organizational bureaucratic political theories) comprised of political negotiations, economic
strife, and social and class misalliance.1 Historiographical research that analyzes past events and
attempts to introduce new empirical data to formulate new economic and military oriented

1 David Albright, Peddling Peril (Free Press), p. 6-9.; Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton and Company, New York,
2012), p. 3, 46.
1

patterns or causalities can also be found, however, the presence of specialized academic
knowledge, due to DPRK’s nature of withholding information, is limited and research about the
North Korean dilemma is greatly subjective. Examinations tend to be deeply speculative without
providing a basis of analytic and process-oriented inquiries that provides objective feedback.
It is the goal of this investigation to aid in the compilation of limited academic research
on North Korea and examine potential motives towards its behavior, especially in regards to its
alleged production of very high-quality counterfeit US currency, or supernotes, and a possible
connection to nuclear arms development. In contrast to theoretical or historical research, the
application of a methodological tool, more specifically Analysis of Competing Hypotheses
(ACH), based on scientific cognitive processing will be used to evaluate the North Korean
supernote-nuclear relationship.

The application of this research method strives to negate

subjectivity by minimizing cognitive limitations is an invaluable tool when making judgments
that entail a high risk of error in reasoning.

1.2 Research Area of Study
North Korea’s policy of nuclear armament is a growing threat that is endangering
international diplomacy and security. DPRK is a crippled and fragile nation and its relationship
with the international community is severely restrained. Although its means of financing an
atomic arms program are limited, exhaustive measures to inhibit the further development and
proliferation of North Korean nuclear weaponry, primarily through the application of sanctions,
has encouraged DPRK to seek ulterior means to finance its hostile agenda. The sources of these
illicit funds are numerous, however, the production of high-quality, counterfeit US supernotes
could be a powerful catalyst in fulfilling DPRK’s nuclear objectives.
The motives as to why DPRK demands a seat as a world-class nuclear power needs to be
2

more empathetically studied and addressed, so as to placate North Korean diplomacy and prevent
nuclear development and proliferation. Further assessment of the fabrication and distribution of
counterfeit US currency facilitates in gaining additional insight in regards to DPRK’s nuclear
weapons development, and also provides a reflective insight as to how the illicit printing of US
money serves as a multifaceted weapon that undermines American security, by devaluing the
economy.

Ultimately, the argument of this thesis will address whether North Korea is

manufacturing supernotes and discuss the extent of how supernotes are financing North Korea’s
emerging nuclear arms program.
The existing body of academic literature on North Korea and its responsibility in the
production and proliferation of US counterfeit currency is not well-developed; not surprisingly
so, as the acquisition of verified intelligence in regards to this matter is not plentiful and
speculative at best.

Therefore, to better understand the gravity of North Korea’s nuclear

potential propagated by US supernotes, a structured evaluation assessed by weighted evidence
will be compiled and analyzed by employing ACH. As much is unknown about North Korea,
proving or disproving a hypothesis that DPRK’s production of counterfeit US supernotes and its
relationship to nuclear arms development leaves much supposition. Employing a cognitive
process-oriented research model based on a scientific method that provides an auditable trail of
thought processing, such as ACH, will encourage more discussion of the North Korean dilemma.

1.3 Research Aim and Objectives
This thesis will use Analysis of Competing Hypotheses to evaluate whether DPRK is
producing supernotes and will determine to what extent supernotes are financing North Korea’s
emerging nuclear arms program. In attempting to reach this aim the application of ACH will
delegate the incremental goals in satisfying the following objectives: the development of
3

multiple hypotheses in an attempt to explain a supernote-nuclear arms program link, assessing
evidence from assorted sources, providing a diagnostic weighing hypotheses and evidence, and
refining the evidence for inconsistencies and sensitivity. Evidence gathered will be provided
from a multitude of sources; from governmental sources, news outlets, and texts from specialists
in the study of currency production and nuclear studies. The acquired evidence will be used to
critically verify if North Korea has the means to produce supernotes, then a determination of the
optimal hypothesis will be executed, as well as a summary of alternatives that were considered
and why they were rejected. The milestones developed throughout the process will then serve as
indicators for future analyses.
To aid in the rejecting of less than ideal hypotheses the use a computer program, ACH
2.0.5, developed by Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) in collaboration with Richards J. Heuer
will be employed, so as to minimize user error in the fabrication and analysis of the hypothesesevidence matrix.

1.4 Assumptions, Preliminary Questions, and Preliminary Hypotheses
The purpose of this study is not merely to gain a better understanding of the impact that
North Korea made supernotes could be used to aid the development of a nuclear arms program,
the greater portion of many sources give preference to this objective, but to also identify further
ramifications resulting in the manufacturing and dispersal of supernotes. The potential damage
that can be yielded from such an operation could be greater than that of nuclear threat from a
saber-rattling North Korea, especially in regards to the capacity of economic damage to the
United States and ultimately the world.

By use of ACH this study will address the following questions:
4

-

Does North Korea have the ability to create supernotes?

-

Is the production of supernotes in North Korea responsible for the advancement of
DPRK’s nuclear arm program?

-

Does North Korea have ulterior motives for creating supernotes, other than for the
advancement of a nuclear arms program?

1.5 Framework of Thesis
The thesis will be comprised of six chapters and ending with an appendix. The literature
review will be presented in Chapter 2 and will describe North Korea’s economic need for
supernotes, how supernotes are made, and how the international community is addressing the
counterfeit threat. Chapter 3 will address which research method is the superior choice when
presented with a high-risk situation and evidence of variable confidence; the choice between
ACH versus more conventional methods steeped in intuitive processing and commonly practiced
among intelligence and security agencies will be discriminated. Chapter 4 will exercise the
verdict of the previous chapter and engage in the methodological application of the process, stepby-step. The initial aim and objectives of this study will be delivered, hypotheses will be
developed, honed, and evidence diagnosticity assessed. Chapter 5 will present the findings of
the hypotheses-evidence evaluation through a visual representation via a matrix. It is also in this
section that modifications to hypotheses-evidence matrices will be displayed. Chapter 6, the
final chapter, will provide a review of the results and provide critical findings, milestones, shortcomings, and recommendations for further research. The appendix will present a timeline of
significant events since North Korea joined the United Nations.

5

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Illicit activities North Korea are contributing to its state-run organized crime operations.2
One such illicit activity may include the fabrication and distribution of counterfeit US currency,
which could be aiding in the funding of its nuclear arms program. 3 In the event that North
Korea is indeed using illicit means, such as supernotes, to fund nuclear arms development poses
a grave threat; military weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s) could be used hostilely by North
Korean forces, as well as be sold to dangerous nations or aggressive non-state actors.4 The
profit yielded from selling supernote funded weapons technologies are re-circulated into North
Korean state endorsed criminal enterprises.5 This process then repeats itself in a cyclical manner
perpetuating the advancement of more WMD proliferation. Resuming the production of US
supernotes could serve as a catalyst that accelerates the possibility of atomic disaster.
The availability of literature that provides a thorough analysis of supernotes and its link
with North Korean nuclear arms development is limited. This scarcity of research, academic or
otherwise, demonstrates the need for a thorough analysis of the supernote-WMD link. Differing
opinions also contest whether North Korea is producing supernotes with a possible nuclear arms

2 Korea Criminals - Pyongyang's Persistent Illegal Activities (Jane’s Intelligence Review, 16
September 2010 ), p. 1-2, 5.
3 Ibid, p. 1-2.
4 David Albright, Peddling Peril (Free Press, New York, 2010), p. 4.
5 Korea Criminals, p. 4.
6

program link.6 Data that is difficult to verify, inconsistent reporting, and varied viewpoints
makes determining a North Korean supernote-nuclear arms link a challenging study.
This literature review will provide an examination of North Korea’s relationship between
supernotes and their nuclear program in five parts. The first part will acknowledge why DPRK’s
fractured economy necessitates the use of supernotes. Part two will focus on how supernotes are
dangerous and how they are used to advance North Korean objectives. Parts three and four will
address where and how supernotes are manufactured and what efforts have been used to confront
the supernote threat. Lastly, part six will accommodate an alternative perspective that provides
evidence that North Korea may not be the originator of the supernotes.

2.2 Why Would DPRK Use Supernotes?
The counterfeiting of hard US currency could stimulate the North Korean economy by
having a compounding effect to produce more illicit moneymaking programs that further
stimulate the North Korean economy and contribute to the development and proliferation of the
country’s weapons and nuclear arms. North Korea’s economic climate is not favorable to gain
self-sustaining strength as the country imports more goods than it exports and has billions of
dollars in trade deficits.7 DPRK’s destitute and fractured economy is made possible by the loss
of financial supporters, the need to support a luxury hungry elite class, and enduring unforgiving

6 Kevin G. Hall, US Counterfeiting Charges Against N. Korea Based on Shaky Evidence
(McClatchy Newspapers, 10 January 2008) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/01/10/24521/uscounterfeiting-charges-against.html (accessed 10 December 2013).; Elich, North Korea and the
Supernote Enigma, p. 10.; David L. Asher, The North Korean Criminal State, Its Ties to
Organized Crime and Possibility of WMD Proliferation (Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online,
no. 05-92A), p.1.; Klaus W. Bender, Supernotes: Das Geheimnis der gefaelschten Dollarnoten,
(Frankfurter Allegemeine, 1 August 2007), p.1.
7 World Factbook, “North Korea,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed 15 November 2013).
7

climatic difficulties.8
2.2.1 North Korea’s Current Economic Plight
North Korea is one of the world's most restrictive economies and has been experiencing
an on-going economic crisis for decades. Years of financial mismanagement due to
underinvestment from foreign entities, material shortages, and poor maintenance has resulted in
stagnated industrial power output for years; now at a fraction of pre-1990 levels. According to
the CIA World Factbook, large-scale military spending draws off resources needed for
investment and civilian consumption and frequent weather-related crop failures aggravated
chronic food shortages caused by on-going systemic problems, including a lack of arable land,
collective farming practices, poor soil quality, insufficient fertilization, and persistent shortages
of tractors and fuel.9
As North Korea does not publish reliable economic data to be released for the
international community, the figures provided to federal agencies, such as the CIA for example,
are compiled and extrapolated by third-parties (economic estimates for North Korea provided for
CIA were made by Angus MADDISON in a study conducted for the OECD)10; therefore,
making economic observations and forecasts speculative. Despite having less than accurate data,
the information provided about North Korea is sufficient enough to determine that the economic
stability of DPRK is weak and has not demonstrated significant economic growth since the pre1990s.

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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According to latest estimates, North Korea has not been able to improve upon its
economy. CIA assessments have identified North Korea’s GDP to be stagnant for the last
several years with no indicator for improvement. For the previous 3 years, DPRK has been
recognized as having a GDP of approximately $40 billion with no fluctuation.11 As estimates
may vary, reports have shown inconclusive evidence of DPRK’s economic trade activity,
however, recent CIA estimates over the previous several years indicate that North Korea exports
slightly more than it imports, $4.7 billion versus $4.3 billion, but its current debts of more than
$12 billion is a key factor preventing economic progress.12

2.2.2. Fall of Soviet Union, Displaced North Korean Nationals, and Diminished Support
North Korea’s dependence on Soviet financial backing made DPRK more representative
of a puppet regime that adheres its allegiance to the Kremlin than as an independent state.
Historically, North Korea has served a buffer state that partitioned western influences south of
the DMZ on the 38th parallel. However, North Korean commercial trade volumes began falling
in 1991 with the dissolving of the Soviet Union and collapse of the Eastern Bloc, North Korea’s
primary trade partner at the time.13
The loss of its primary financial sponsor yielded in DPRK reaching a minimum of $1.6
billion in commercial trade at the end of the famine period in 1998—less than 40 percent of the

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
9

1990 value of $4.2 billion.14 From 1990-2006, North Korea has accumulated a $10 billion trade
deficit in its economic relations with China and South Korea. In 2003 alone, North Korea had an
$835 million trade deficit. Additionally, North Korea has failed to pay back loans; accounting
for a $12 billion accumulation of loan defaults, primarily to Soviet Russia, contributing to its
inability to procure further loans on the international market.15
Furthermore, not only was North Korea’s accumulated legitimate trade deficits were over
$10 billion, it was increasing by around $1.2 billion a year. Yet, though the country had been
unable to borrow money on international markets since the 1970s, it was managing to acquire
enough hard currency to sustain its military components and ensure the “palace economy” of the
Kim regime.16 It can also be added that East Asian specialist and envoy for former president
G.W. Bush, David Asher, said, “We knew their economy was in deep trouble. What we couldn’t
understand was why they didn’t seem bothered by sanctions, or want to cut a deal over their
nuclear-weapons program. They should have been bankrupt, but they seemed to be surviving.”17
The end of Soviet patronage marked the end of a political era and introduced greater
economic hardship to DPRK, however, North Korea’s financial disparity would worsen during
the years after the fall of the Eastern Bloc as Koreans in Japan were sending less money home. 18
That source of income is a group known as Chongryon, or the "General Association of Korean

14 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Follow the Money: North Korea’s External Resources
and Constraints (Korea Economic Institute and the Korea International Institute for Economic
Policy, 2008), p. 84.
15 Klaus W Bender, Supernotes: Das Geheimnis der gefaelschten Dollarnoten (Frankfurter
Allegemeine Zeitung, 2007), p.3.
16 David Rose, North Korea’s Dollar Store (Vanity Fair, August 5, 2009), p. 5.
17 Ibid., p. 5.
18 David E. Kaplan and Mark Madden, The Wise Guy Regime (US News and World Report,
February 15, 1999), p. 2.
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Residents in Japan." The Japan-based, pro-Pyongyang group links North Korea with a sizable
community of ethnic Koreans living in Japan.19 Chongryon’s three-fold objectives are to:
advocate pro-Pyongyang ideology among Japanese Koreans, collect money from JapaneseKoreans that are sympathetic to their cause and relay those funds to North Korea, and manage
scores of businesses whose sole purpose is to generate cash for the North Korean regime.20
The amount of money that Chongryon sent to North Korea in its prime isn't known for
certain, but it is thought to have made up a substantial chunk of the national budget. By
incorporating dubious elements in its funds collections DPRK cemented its foundations as a
state-sponsored criminal enterprise since the establishment of the Chongryon in the 1950’s.
Chongryon's business ventures included off-book pachinko parlors, pubs, prostitution rings, and
real estate that produced over a billion dollars a year in revenue. At the peak of its money
acquisition capacity Chongryon elements amassed about $25 billion in 1990.21 However,
Chongryon is currently at a loss and was ordered by Japanese government to sell its headquarters
and pay back outstanding debts acquired from the Japanese government in the late 1990s. 22 By
losing Chongryon North Korea was forced to surrender a multi-billion dollar bankroll that would
further exacerbate the country's long-term financial health.
2.2.3. Increased Pandering for North Korea’s Growing Elite Class
The Kim regime demonstrates a bipolar social disparity, where the top 1% are lauded
with comforts that are not available to the general DPRK populace. This elite class with a deep

19 Max Fisher, North Korea is losing a crucial source of income: Koreans in Japan
(Washington Post, 25 October 2013), p. 1.
20 Ibid., p. 1.
21 Ibid., p. 2.
22 Ibid., p. 1.
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hunger for luxury items has motivated DPRK financial management to try to cut costs by
reducing the resources necessary to support these elites. However, the elite class is striated and,
depending on social rank, must make sacrifices to support the country according to the “Military
First” or Songun policy, proclaimed in 1999.23 Self-sufficiency, or Juche, is encouraged among
the elites. For example, DPRK diplomats sent abroad by Pyongyang have been apprehended
numerous times soliciting illicit contraband such as drugs and counterfeit currency to finance
their political missions. Even more distressing for North Korea is that the number of affected
elites grows larger.24
Kim’s cadre of social elites is a growing body whose sumptuous appetite for material
extravagance will increase indefinitely until the fall of the Kim dictatorship. This creation of a
“court economy,” akin to that practiced by an absolute monarch sovereignty, has been the plight
of many failed kingdoms. The court economy is responsible for approximately 30 to 40 percent
of North Korea’s entire economy and is also referred to in a number of other ways, such as the
Supreme Leader’s economy, the 3rd economy, the elites’ economy, the cadre economy, or the
party (KWP) economy.25

2.2.4. Droughts, Floods, Agricultural Distress, and Weak Electrical Infrastructure
Since 1990, North Korea has experienced twelve years of intermittent floods, droughts
and famines, which killed over two million North Koreans, and caused 200,000 refugees to flee

23 Andre J. Coe, North Korea’s New Cash Crop (The Washington Quarterly, 2005), p. 75.
24 Ibid., p. 75.
25 Paul R. Kan and Robert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s
Illicit International Activities (US Army War College. Institute for Strategic Studies, March
2010), p. 21.
12

for survival. The North Korean government was desperate for any outlet of monetary income.26
Due to the prevalence of uncontrollable and unfortunate circumstances caused by these natural
phenomena, North Korea’s economic and social state of affairs encouraged greater involvement
in illicit activities. It was during this time that North Korea realized its potential to maximize
profit from its illegal activities, funneling those monies not into the sustenance of its population
through food and development, but into the research, development, production, and trafficking of
missiles and nuclear-related technology.27
The tragic events that transpired over the course of DPRK’s years of famine compounded
by torrential deluges and parched earth could have been better handled had North Korea a
satisfactory utilities infrastructure. North Korea is an energy starved nation whose natural
resources are bountiful with geological ore, but lacks the vital petroleum reserves needed to
sustain a country. Under terms of the 1994 Agreement between North Korea and the US, DPRK
was to receive two nuclear energy reactors. South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation
agreed to build them at a cost of $4 billion at a site, Yongbyon, on the North Korean east coast,
while Japan pledged $1 billion to the program to help cover additional costs. In accordance to the
Agreement, the US shipped 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil a year, worth $50 million, to North
Korea for power generation.28 The agreement broke down in 2002 after it was revealed that
even though North Korea had kept its promise to stop producing plutonium for warheads, it had
started a new program to develop warheads with enriched uranium. North Korea is now

26Rose, North Korea’s Dollar Store, p. 5.
27 Meridee Jean Trimble, US Policy Options Toward Stopping North Korea’s Illicit Activities,
(Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007), p. 13.
28 Donald Kirk, Nuclear North Korea: 6 Ways It Differs From Iran (Christian Science Monitor,
5 December 2013), p. 2.
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resuming work at Yongbyon, but faces severe problems due to international sanctions over the
North's nuclear weapon program.29

2.2.5. A Fractured Economy and a Cash Only Society
DPRK’s faulty credit record and illicit activity history makes for a society where people
tend to transact largely in cash, which in itself is not illegal, but in this market, it is in fact often
the only way. The designator of “terrorist nation” excludes DPRK from contact with the US
financial system. Only a handful of businesses are willing to accept the well-known risk that
DPRK has defaulted on numerous loans and trade. Nigel Cowie, general manager of North
Korean owned Daedong Bank, says that DPRK’s currency is largely non-transferable between
nations, “so imported goods are bought and sold for hard currency.”30 Furthermore, North
Korea’s reliance on cash transactions is that DPRK bank accounts are believed to be dispersed in
various off-shore accounts so as to prevent the freezing of all North Korean monetary funds. An
example of North Korea’s dependence on off-shore accounts involves the freezing of Banco
Delta Asia of Macau funds; U.S. Treasury identified DPRK engaging in illicit banking with
BDA.31

2.3. How are Supernotes Dangerous to the US and the World?
The production of US supernotes is conducive for the development of other illicit
activities. Just as one hand washes the other, the collaborative efforts of North Korea’s state

29 Ibid.
30 Gregory Elich, North Korea and the Supernote Enigma (Global Research, 7 May 2008), p. 9.
31 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of
Denuclearization and Proliferation (Asian Survey, 2010), p. 557, 565.
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sponsored crime aids in creating and sustaining new illicit ventures to further fund DPRK
objectives. North Korea’s advancement of its military and nuclear undertakings is an increasing
international threat that continuously demands greater monetary funding. In order to generate
more revenue to fund its nuclear objectives North Korea has a growing client list that includes,
but not limited to, rogue Middle Eastern nations.32

2.3.1. Regime Survival By Counterfeiting and Other Illicit Activity
North Korea may appear to have the familiar outlines of a typical corrupt autocratic
regime, but it is different in that most nations with defunct leaders choose to engage in illicit
activity for a monetary return. North Korea, on the other hand, engages in criminal acts as a
matter of regime survival. Traditionally, organized criminals try to gain access to and leverage
the authority of central governments, however, the opposite is true when observing the criminal
element in North Korea, where the state is mandating the progression of illegal operations
through state management.33
North Korea’s involvement in illicit activities to fund its nuclear program presents a
security threat to the region and US interests. Some illegal methods to acquire additional funds
for DPRK coffers include, producing and distributing counterfeit currency and goods, and
wrongfully selling military equipment and technology, namely within the nuclear realm. 34 North
Korea has been engaged in proliferation activities, ranging from some role in the construction of
a nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert, to missile sales, to murky “service contracts” with a range

32 Albright, p. 3.
33 Kan and Collins, Criminal Sovereignty, p. 2
34 Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Counterfeiting of US Currency (Congressional Research
Service, 2009), p. 1.
15

of countries in conjunction with arms exports.35 Another example concerns DPRK’s relationship
with A.Q. Khan, Pakistan’s chief nuclear scientist. Khan passed more than $3 million from
North Koreans to a senior Pakistani army general in exchange for technical drawings and
centrifuge schematics.36 Pyongyang representatives would present the missile technology in
exchange for AQK’s proprietary nuclear expertise, such as how to use centrifuges to enrich
enough uranium for a weapon.37Michael Hayden, former director of CIA, claims, “North Korea
ask only for two things of its customers: first, can they pay, and second, can they keep a
secret?”38
Although figures may vary evidence exists that North Korean state involvement in a
variety of illicit activities and schemes yielded annual revenues from estimates as low as $500
million to $1 billion for the years 2005-2006.39 The following year numerous sources concur
that the money collected is an estimated $1 billion earned annually.40 To better identify the
scope of North Korea’s shady endeavors consider that in 2005, all of North Korea's legitimate
exports totaled $1.7 billion, according to a CIA estimate.41 This, therefore, insinuates that North
Korea’s black market revenues potentially make for as much as a third of its GDP.
The net monetary gains from under-handed operations are not to be taken lightly.

35 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of
Denuclearization and Proliferation (Asian Survey, 2010), p. 553.
36 Albright, Peddling Power, p. 211.
37 Bob Crilly, “AQ Khan, the godfather of North Korea's bomb.” The Telegraph (12 February
2013) http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/robcrilly/100202507/ (accessed 15 November 2013).
38 Albright, Peddling Power, p. 160.
39 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Follow the Money: North Korea’s External Resources
and Constraints, (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008), p. 5-6.
40 Trimble, US Policy Options, p. 60.; Coe, North Korea’s New Cash Crop, p. 79.
41 Bill Powell, The Sopranos State (Time Magazine, 23 July 2007), p. 44-48.
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Despite being in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) North Korea accrued about
$2.4 billion in cash for delivering SCUD-B missiles at the end of the Iran-Iraq war.42
Furthermore, in 2003, an official from US Forces Korea (USFK) claimed that that in 2001, North
Korea exported ballistic missiles worth $580 million to the Middle East.43 More recently, some
sources report that North Korea has been exporting conventional military weapons to Burma
(Myanmar) in contravention to current U.N. prohibitions against North Korea.44
Another example of North Korea’s application of illicit activity for monetary gain
includes a ship, during 1995, destined for North Korea was seized with cigarette paper printed
with the Marlboro brand. This paper shipment was intended for use in North Korean counterfeit
cigarettes, which contained enough paper wrappers to have an estimated street value of $1
billion.45
The inconsistencies in the reported value of North Korean illicit activities is an unsettling
weakness, as a solid number cannot be agreed upon.

Furthermore, the gaps in available

information make the value of supernotes questionable. Currency authentication specialists have
confirmed that North Korea’s annual revenue from counterfeit bills were $15 to $20
million.46Another source claims the reproduction of US currency over $10 million a year in

42 Counterfeiting of US Currency Abroad (Subcommittee on General Oversight and
Investigations of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 1996), p. 122.
43 Dick K. Nanto and Liana Sun Wyler, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities.
(Congressional Research Service, 2008), p. 3.
44 Ibid., p. 3.
45 Trimble, US Policy Options, p. 21.
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counterfeit US currency.47 Despite that North Korea is acquiring millions of dollars from
supernotes, US Secret Service spokesman Brian Leary opts to not sensationalize the seriousness
of this shady money-making scheme by emphasizing that less than 0.01 percent of all the US
dollars in circulation are fake.48 Leary also claimed that the Secret Service seized around $66
million in in supernotes for 2012.49

2.3.2. Growing WMD Threat
The proliferation of North Korean missile technology and operational missiles carries
great consequences, as the arms and nuclear technology could be sold to rogue nations or nonstate actors that could upset regional and international security. This threat is becoming an
increasing dangerous actuality as demonstrated by North Korea’s periodic testing of nuclear and
ballistic arms. DPRK’s “Military First” or “Songun” policy demands that all available resources
are to be given and utilized for the betterment of the state. For example, North Korea’s net
exports during 1999 were $520 million. During the same year North Korea spent more than
$200 million on its nuclear program. The percentage of funds acquired from exports were used
for nuclear arm development is about 40%.50
However, due to North Korea’s poor economic performance, there is a strong fear North
Korea will act too hastily in selling its nuclear technology to another country or a non-state actor.
Evidence of some cooperation with Syria, Libya, and potentially Burma has alarmed national

47 Trimble, US Policy Options, p. 19-20.
48 Alan Yu, All About The Benjamins: US Introduces New $100 Note (National Public Radio, 7
October 2013), p. 2.
49 Ibid., p. 2.
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security experts. Furthermore, the Israeli bombing of a nuclear facility in Syria in 2007 raised
concern about North Korean collaboration.51 Despite speculation in the media about Iran-DPRK
technologies and weapons proliferation, the official position of the US Intelligence Community
is that North Korea and Iran are not cooperating on nuclear weapons development.52
Although the greater consensus by the US intelligence community regards DPRK’s
involvement in nuclear proliferation as not a concern of the highest priority, other federal
agencies have acknowledged the potential threat. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), for example, has been closely following the activities of
DPRK and has found that the national bank of North Korea, Bank of East Land (aka Dongbang
Bank), is responsible for the direct funding of the Green Pine Corporation, a North Korean
military arms manufacturer.53 Furthermore, this same report released by the Department of the
Treasury adds that North Korean banking and arms trading also involves transactions with
Iranian financial institutions, including Bank Melli and Bank Sepah.54
More recently, it has been found that DPRK’s chief weapons manufacturer, not to be
confused with Green Pine, is Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and
has been involved in trading with Hong Kong Electronics, located on Kish Island, Iran 55, and

51 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy,
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52 Ibid., p. 5.
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Trans Multi Mechanics Co. Ltd. Of Taiwan.56

It can be determined that the Treasury

Department identifies the interactions between these entities are aimed to destabilize the region
and undermine the global nonproliferation regime.
DPRK’s need for economic stimulus is paramount. Its failed market has resulted in a
desperate financial situation, where even the most unsavory of clients are welcomed so as to
accommodate a potential sale and aid in rebounding the economy and further advance the
nuclear arms program. The sale of military related supply and arms are amongst the top billings
for DPRK and its client roster includes, but is not limited to: Peru, Burma/Myanmar, Iran
(Shebab), Pakistan (Ghauri), Syria, Libya, Egypt (Scud), UAE, and Yemen.57
It can be assumed that the resulting consequence from the production and circulation of
bogus American dollars is the creation of a North Korean nuclear weapons enterprise, which
should be profitable as long as sufficient demand exists. In addition to rogue states that may
desire to obtain nuclear capabilities through North Korean enterprises, other customers, primarily
terrorist organizations, will also demand to have access to North Korean manufactured WMDs.
Terrorist organizations may view the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as a religious
duty and expend considerable effort on developing, purchasing, or stealing chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN).58 These organizations might be first in line for a
North Korean nuclear weapon, although their demand would be relatively low due to their
limited resources. Notably, although non-aggressor states typically use nuclear weapons
defensively so as to deter potentially hostile states, terrorist organizations would presumably use

56 Ibid.
57 Glyn Ford, North Korea on the Brink (Pluto Press, 2009), p. 159.
58 Coe, North Korea’s New Cash Crop, p. 78.
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the weapons offensively.59

It can be assumed that DPRK illicit military arms trading is

undeniable, as a counter-perspective could not be found.

2.3.3. Undermining US economic stability with Fake Money
An ulterior motive as to why DPRK is intent on producing supernotes is not just to amass
a mighty military presence, but also destabilize the integrity of the US dollar. Although unlikely,
an extensive influx of supernotes could weaken confidence in the US dollar and damage the US
economy, with an impact felt throughout the world.60North Korea’s demoralizing of US
currency can be very effective and more threatening than an offensive attack with military
forces, as the fear of an unstable US dollar strikes more anxiety than a bellicose DPRK.
The exact value of the dollar, in current world circulation, is debatable. Although various
government offices and professional agencies report on the estimated value of total US currency
circulating throughout the world, consensus claims that the total value of US currency is about
$750 billion. On the other hand, the assessed value of North Korea manufactured supernotes is
valued at $480 million.61 Although the ratio of supernotes to official federal currency is less
than one-tenth of a percent, the implications for potential harm must not be discounted.62
However, any figure, especially one relating to forgeries of high quality, must be a guess. David
Asher, head of the Treasury Department’s Illicit Activities Initiative (IAI), said that the total

59 Ibid., p. 78.; Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 3
60 Edward R. Royce, Gangster Regime: How North Korea Counterfeits United States Currency
(House Foreign Affairs Committee, 12 March 2007), p. 5.
61 Ibid., p. 15.; Kaplan and Madden, The Wise Guy Regime, p. 39.
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amount of North Korean printed counterfeit bills might be in the hundreds of millions.63
Estimates provided by the CIA, Secret Service, and ROK Intelligence Agency show that at least
$45 million in US supernotes of North Korean origin are in circulation 64; although this reported
amount is less than the $480 million value, as previously mentioned, one must also consider that
the US Treasury Department regularly seizes counterfeit notes and destroys them. Also, the
attrition of bills must also be considered, as printed currency is not indestructible.
Despite being one of the most, if not the most, counterfeited money in the world the
dollar remains a “global currency,” with some countries adopting it as their own. If estimates of
North Korean counterfeit bills hold true, it would constitute a small portion of currency in
circulation. However, the disclosure of extensive counterfeiting could also depress the value of
the dollar, leading some to believe that the scope of North Korea counterfeiting is being
downplayed by United States officials.65 Also, “dollarized” economies, those nations that have
adopted the US dollar as their own currency depend upon the integrity and stability of the US
dollar. This is why counterfeiting activity has had a profound effect on not only our economy,
but the international markets as well.66
Compromising the legitimacy of US currency could yield in widespread economic crises;
some banks would be unwilling to accept legitimate US banknotes, or could charge
additional fees when exchanging $100 bills into local currency.67 For instance, after supernotes

63 Royce, Gangster Regime, p. 10.
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began appearing in Ireland in the 1990s, Irish financial institutions declined to exchange $100
bills. Likewise, in Taiwan in 2004 and Peru in 2005, financial institutions temporarily refused
service on $100 notes after supernotes were found circulating within each respective nation.68
An earlier event occurred in 2004, where Taiwan’s central bank issued a warning that supernotes
had been turning up on the island. In a panic, Taiwanese banks were overwhelmed by customers
seeking to return $100 bills totaling hundreds of millions of dollars, most of them perfectly
genuine. “It was effectively a run on the dollar,” says David Asher. “No one knew if their money
was real or fake.”69
The economic prosperity endured by the US dollar is admired, so much so that the
attempts to replicate the notes, especially $100 notes makes it the most forged American bill.70
To make matters worse, the $100 notes also last an average of eight years, significantly longer
than others, because they're not used often.71 Even worse, other sources, namely the US Federal
Reserve, place the circulation life of the $100 bill at 15 years,72 almost double the estimated
circulation life compared to Smith. As the circulation life of the supernote can be determined to
be a minimum of 8-15 years the introduction of newly designed bills to detour counterfeiting is
merely a small obstacle, as DPRK has more than a decade to liquidate its current stocks of
supernotes and update its printing presses before overwhelming suspicion engulfs North Korea’s
production of counterfeit US currency.
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2.4. Where and How are Supernotes Made?
North Korea is using a moneymaking model more popularly practiced by crime
syndicates and has made crime a vital component of its economy. Central Committee Bureau 39
(also known as Office 39) of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) is a state apparatus that is
responsible for the manufacturing and distribution of counterfeit currency, drugs, and
merchandise.73 This office is essential in developing and maintaining alternative methods to
stimulate the influx of monetary capital into North Korea’s threatened economy.
Office 39 is one section in a consortium of other devious offices that is estimated to bring
between $500 million to $1 billion a year or more with assets totaling about $5 billion.74. Just
as Office 39 is responsible for operating large-scale ventures, such as drug and cigarette factories
and the printing presses that produce counterfeit banknotes, sibling offices combine bankrolling,
logistics, and other factors into the illicit activities list. For example, Office 99, raises funds by
selling missiles and other weapons. These military components were made possible via illicit
activities: sales by Office 39.75

2.4.1. Components of Supernote Fabrication
North Korean manufactured counterfeit $100 US bills look a lot like the genuine article;
so much so that with such accuracy and precision only the most highly trained analysts can
decipher the authenticity of the note, hence, the moniker “supernote”. Highly sophisticated

73 Kan and Collins, Criminal Sovereignty, p. 1, 2.
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methods and tool are used to manufacture counterfeit notes, primarily US $100 bill.76 These
include the purchase very expensive and difficult to obtain hardware and talent. The supernote is
so convincing in its quality that it is often identified as equivalent in look and feel to the genuine
article.
This currency reproduction operation has been labeled as the most sophisticated in the
world, as described by the US Secret Service.77 The counterfeit bills are manufactured using
similar devices and methods employed by the US Bureau of Engraving and Printing.78
Supernotes, just like authentic US currency, are produced on a special intaglio press so that their
intricate design is raised above their surface; microprinted features, 1/42,000th of an inch high,
found on real dollars are reproduced exactly on counterfeit ones.79

The counterfeiting

production materials used to create the supernotes also includes high-tech equipment from Japan,
paper from Hong Kong, and ink from France.80 However, the expense to obtain the necessary
hardware to print supernotes is greater than the annual net revenue from counterfeit US bills.
According to one source, using Nigeria as a recent model, a new money printing operation has an
initial cost of $135 million.81 Yet, North Korea has the vital components to unofficially print US
currency, as it was a customer to the same vendors as the US. For example, DPRK has a $10
million intaglio printing press, the same used by the US Bureau of Engraving and Printing.82
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The Bureau of Engraving and Printing uses Giori intaglio presses for the engraved portions of its
bank notes, and an offset press for the background colors; supernotes use the same technology. 83
The raised ridges caused by intaglio printing is a delicate effect that ordinary counterfeiters can’t
duplicate.
North Korea purchased an intaglio press from the Swiss firm Giori in the mid-1970s.84
This is regarded as an indication that DPRK has the technology available to potentially print
supernotes; however, due to technical advancements in printing, the equipment necessary to
update the machinery could not be obtained by the DPRK, due to defaulted loans for the Giori
press. For that reason, Giori ceased shipping spare parts to North Korea many years ago.85 Other
components used by both DPRK and US include the paper, which is made from southern US
cotton exclusively by Crane Dalton86, and the top-secret reflective safety ink formula, made by
French company Sicpa.87
Since 1996, the US has tried to outwit the supernote manufacturers by twice changing the
design of $100 bills, but the counterfeiters have kept pace. 88 Conversely, it could also be said
that the North Korean supernote is responsible for increasing the sophistication of redesigned US
currency.89 The Bureau of Engraving and Printing designs new notes every seven to 10 years to

83 Elich, North Korea and the Supernote Enigma, p. 2.
84 Ibid,. p. 2.
85 Ibid., p. 2.
86 The Mystery of the Supernotes (Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik,
2010), p. 2.
87 Klaus W Bender, Supernotes: Das Geheimnis der gefaelschten Dollarnoten. (Frankfurter
Allegemeine Zeitung, 2007, p. 4.; Royce, Gangster Nation, p. 11.
88 Rose, North Korea’s Dollar Store, p. 6.
89 Royce, Gangster Nation, p. 16.
26

stay ahead of counterfeiters. The new designs are part of a multiyear initiative to implement the
most ambitious currency redesign in US history.90 On the other hand, should the US not be able
to continuously stay a step ahead of North Korean supernote design modifications, supernotes
are expected to remain in circulation for the foreseeable future making it possible for the DPRK
to continue to use any existing stocks of counterfeit supernotes.91

2.5. How the US and the Global Community Addressed Supernotes
The failure of the 6-Party Talks has presented an increased number of incidents involving
North Korean acts of aggression and hostility, especially in regards to nuclear arms testing.92
These recurrent transgressions are yielding elevated attention from the international community.
The aim is that with the application of enough diplomatic pressure North Korea will not only
silence their persistent sabre rattling, but also terminate the proliferation of WMDs, as well as
halting DPRK illicit activities, such as supernote production.93 However, the good intentions of
tough love, demonstrated by the implementation of executive orders, resolutions, and sanctions,
have often backfired.
2.5.1. Sanctions and Failure
Diplomatic meetings with DPRK are not easily coordinated, as political tensions
frequently flare. The number of attempts to merely initiate diplomacy talks makes for a lengthy
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list94; however, recent attempts (namely, the 6-Party Talks) have not yielded in providing any
headway in the development of peace accords, denuclearization, trade reform, or reducing the
occurrence of supernotes.95 Older UN Security Resolutions and the 1994 Agreed Framework
legislated against the production and trade of nuclear technologies and arms, however, no
provisions were made regarding supernotes until the second term of the Obama administration.96
The best made intentions often do not become successful. Just as well-intended sanctions
are frequently drafted to restrain prohibited activity, unforeseen circumstances commonly ensue.
For example, China has repeatedly increased its economic engagement with North Korea after an
imposition of sanctions, thus negating their impact.97 After U.N. sanctions were first
implemented in 2006, Chinese exports to North Korea actually increased by 140 percent by
2009.98 In response to North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan, South Korea cut off most interKorean trade, worth approximately $300 million annually. Yet in the following year, China
increased its trade with Pyongyang by 29 percent, from $2.68 billion to $3.47 billion.99
Furthermore, by ignoring imposed sanctions DPRK is acquiring additional profits by
acting as “straw-purchasers” for rogue nations. For those nations that are under international
scrutiny for potentially dangerous acts or sponsoring of terrorism, DPRK has exhibited
willingness to acquire lengthy lists of goods in exchange for intellectual property and services,
but primarily money. Therefore, it can be assessed that diplomatic mandates, embargoes, and
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sanctions do not work, as rogue nations will forgo these protocols.100
2.5.2. Diplomatic Shortcomings
The Bush administration aversion of DPRK and labeling of “Axis of Evil” did not aid
diplomatic relations between the two nations, but rather worsened them. Bush’s rejection of
Clinton’s 1994 Agreed Framework halted aid to DPRK and yielded in a sour backlash as North
Korea would later withdraw from the NPT in 2003 and initiate a series of nuclear arms tests in
2006, 2009, and 2013.101Furthermore, Bush scrapped the 1994 Agreed Framework due to
DPRK’s reaffirmed trade and aid agreements with China and Russia. 102 The realignment of
these former US adversaries are a difficult obstacle to cross, as trust between these nations are
superb and the potential for a future military conflict with these nations has not been
discounted.103 These mentioned diplomatic shortcomings are emblematic reactionary behaviors
that tend to be exhibited when threatened.
Like his predecessor, G.W. Bush, current US president Obama is choosing to maintain a
rigid position when dealing with DPRK-US relations. Similar to G.W. Bush, Obama faces a
political dilemma where he cannot placate DPRK and convince North Korea to retract its point
of view on illicit activity and nuclear diplomacy. Furthermore, according to the official White
House webpage, “it is unclear whether these links [between supernotes and DPRK nuclear
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armament] still persist.”104
The Blue House, the political executive residence and office of ROK, exemplifies similar
behavior in its approach with DPRK diplomacy. However, Seoul’s diplomatic position when
dealing with North Korea is not as hard-nosed, as compared to the US or UN. For example,
South Korea’s “sunshine policy” toward North Korea is politically unstable and is enticing ROK
to provide DPRK with greater lenience and patience regardless of North Korea’s historical
record for diplomatic failure. It seems as though South Korea is walking delicately over egg
shells. To better illustrate South Korea’s passivity with DPRK, press reports indicate that a
closed briefing given to the National Assembly by the NIS in February 2006 indicated that while
North Korea was involved in counterfeiting in the 1990s, South Korean intelligence had no
information on such activity post-1998. However, recent reports indicate that the United States
has provided Seoul with evidence of North Korean counterfeited 2001 & 2003 series $100 notes
and has determined that $140,000 in bogus currency confiscated by South Korean authorities in
2005 was produced and distributed by North Korea.105 Even though US government officials
provided definitive evidence proving DPRK is engaging in counterfeiting, the intelligence was
discarded, as it may hinder reconciliation with DPRK. The Treasury officials who traveled to
Seoul in January 2006 to discuss the counterfeit issue reportedly did not receive a welcome
reception.106
The political deadlock between North Korea, its regional neighbors, and the US is not a
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unique situation.

Diplomacy with DPRK and the rest of the world has always presented

challenges, nonetheless benevolence and charity has presented an opportunity in regards to North
Korea’s desperate financial situation. As North Korea concedes for assistance, thereby breaking
a national tradition, Juche, or national self-reliance, DPRK is presenting a position of
vulnerability. Humanitarian aid, especially provided from NGOs, has provided a diplomatic
outlet that is exposing North Korea to global modernity, whether it wants it or not. Although
NGOs provide less than 2% of total aid, these organizations are providing more than sustenance,
but rather laying a framework for future international relationship and policy-building.107
NGOs are diplomatic intermediaries that serve as cultural ‘ice-breakers’, as mentioned by Hazel
Smith.108
On the other side of the coin, Kim’s regime regularly seizes humanitarian aid for
propagating North Korea’s Songun policy. By demonstrating humanitarian vulnerability as a
disguise North Korea is manipulating international charities, thus inhibiting the diplomatic
process.109 DPRK’s potential transition from a radical nation poised for increased nuclear
armament to a modern nation of nominal international threat must first overcome the stigma of
corruption found rampant throughout North Korean bureaucracy.110
Regardless of which mask DPRK decides to wear, so as to attempt to gain greater
supplemental aid, many delegates of NGOs or government sponsored aid organizations refuse to
assist North Korea. DPRK continues to demonstrate its position as a potential nuclear threat
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with numerous nuclear arms tests from the 1990’s to present. Former US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton stresses that, “the US will never have normal, sanction-free relations with a
nuclear armed North Korea.”111
2.5.3. UNSCR 2094 of March 2013
The most recent resolution made by the UN Security Council was a unanimously passed
resolution, UNSCR 2094, that strengthens and expands the scope of United Nations sanctions
against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by targeting the illicit activities of diplomatic
personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and the country’s banking relationships, in response to North
Korea’s third nuclear test on 12 February 2013.112 This newest of resolutions recalls its
previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution
1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009) and
resolution 2087 (2013).
From these resolutions, two are of primary importance: UNSCR 1718 and 1874.
Resolution 1718’s principal provision prohibits North Korea from conducting future nuclear tests
or launching a ballistic missile. It calls for the country to suspend its ballistic missile program
and to completely abandon efforts to pursue a nuclear weapon. The resolution included a range
of sanctions designed to prevent North Korea from continuing to develop these programs. Some
of these restrictions include, but are not limited to banning a range of imports and exports to
North Korea and imposing an asset freeze and travel ban on persons involved in the country’s
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nuclear program. Such imports and export include military arms, munitions, and weapons
hardware, as well as some luxury items.113
Resolution 1874 was passed in response to North Korea’s underground nuclear test on
May 25, 2009, which was “in violation and flagrant disregard” of the previous Security Council
Resolution from 2006. The resolution strengthened previous measures against the North Korean
weapons development program by tightening sanctions on additional goods, persons, and
entities. 114Furthermore, this resolution also demands that DPRK retract its statement of
separating from the NPT.
UNSCR 2094 drafted as response to North Korea’s third nuclear test and snubbing of
UNSCR 2087 on February 12, 2013. Like previous resolutions, this version further increased the
breadth of imposed sanctions; yet unlike previous resolutions, UNSCR 2094 specifically aims to
make it more difficult for North Korea to make further progress in its nuclear and ballistic
missile programs by hindering its access to hard cash and technological equipment needed to
build weapons and pursue uranium enrichment.115 Furthermore, by drawing upon and
increasing the scope of UNSCR 1718, the new financial sanctions of UNSCR 2094 targets the
blocking of access of the Kim regime to bulk cash transfers, preventing illicit DPRK activities,
and restricting ties to international banking systems.116 Although monitoring systems are used
to detect and address the violations of these sanctions by North Korea have been described
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within the latest resolution, there is no protocol to implement further disciplinary measures other
than seizing and/or destroying contraband material.117
The US has adopted similar resolutions through Executive Orders and Congressional
House Resolutions. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the
Treasury released on May 6, 2011 an overview of sanctions with respect to North Korea
describing Executive Orders 13466 (June 26, 2008), 13551 (August 30, 2010), and 13570 (April
18, 2011). The demands made by President Obama addresses the restrictions contained in the
UNSC resolutions, namely UNSCR 1718 and 1874. Similar to UNSC resolutions, Obama’s
Executive Orders also reaffirm that North Korea is engaged in the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons. Furthermore, these orders also acknowledge North Korea is
trafficking military arms and related material, facilitating North Korean procurement of luxury
goods, and engaging in illicit activities that involve or support the Government of North Korea or
its senior officials, including money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods or currency, bulk
cash smuggling, and narcotics trafficking.118However, unlike UNSC resolutions, the US
Executive Orders includes criminal charges and punishment; should perpetrators violate any US
Executive Order they will be disciplined with fines ranging up to $1,000,000 and individuals
may also face imprisonment up to 20 years. In addition, civil penalties of up to $250,000 may be
imposed administratively for each violation.119
It can be assumed that the implementation of sanctions has restrained North Korea into an

117 Ibid.
118An Overview of Sanctions With Respect to North Korea (Office of Foreign Assets Control,
US Department of the Treasury, May 6, 2011) http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/Programs/Documents/nkorea.pdf (accessed 10 December 2013).
119 Ibid.
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economic vice, where the only relief from this diplomatic pressure is dismantling of its nuclear
program and seizing of illicit activities. However, there is a possibility that North Korea is not
employing some illicit activities, specifically not producing supernotes, to fund its nuclear
armament program. This is a reoccurring subject worth addressing.

2.6. Perspectives Not Concurrent with the Dominant Paradigm
The controversial argument as to whether or not North Korea is engaged in an illicit
activities operation, which involves the production of supernotes to fund its nuclear armament
program, can be debated in two parts. Multiple sources claim that the possibility for North
Korea to effectively produce supernotes is an impossibility due to its economic restraints.120 As
the production cost to manufacture supernotes is exceptionally high, it can be assumed that
DPRK does not have the financial capital to engage in counterfeiting operations. Furthermore, it
can also be argued that due to North Korea’s diplomatic track record, it does not have the ability
to procure the necessary hardware to print supernotes.

The second argument identifies a

conspiracy theory, where the CIA is responsible for the fabrication of supernotes and is placing
the liability on North Korea.121
It can be contended that North Korea’s frail economic state is not conducive for the
manufacturing of supernotes; DPRK’s monetary resources are not sufficient to fund a counterfeit

120 Kevin G. Hall, US Counterfeiting Charges Against N. Korea Based on Shaky Evidence
(McClatchy Newspapers, 10 January 2008) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/01/10/24521/uscounterfeiting-charges-against.html (accessed 10 December 2013).; Elich, North Korea and the
Supernote Enigma, p. 10.; David L. Asher, The North Korean Criminal State, Its Ties to
Organized Crime and Possibility of WMD Proliferation (Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online,
no. 05-92A), p.1.; Klaus W. Bender, Supernotes: Das Geheimnis der gefaelschten Dollarnoten,
(Frankfurter Allegemeine, 1 August 2007), p.1.
121 Klaus W. Bender, Supernotes: Das Geheimnis der gefaelschten Dollarnoten, (Frankfurter
Allegemeine, 1 August 2007), p. 1.
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currency operation. Swiss federal criminal police, has publicly questioned whether North Korea
is even capable of producing supernotes.122 In May 2007 the Swiss Bundeskriminalpolizei,
which is on the lookout for counterfeit currency demanded that Washington present more
evidence as the Swiss doubt that North Korea is responsible for the production of supernotes.123
Although current numbers of seized supernotes to date exceed $100 million, the Swiss police
agency's doubts are based in part on the small quantity of supernotes that have been seized prior
to their 2007 inquiry; estimates by the US Secret Service report that about $50 million worth of
supernotes were seized between the years of 1989-2008.124
It is probable, but not very possible, that the US Secret Service is confiscating the
majority of supernotes. In the event that this were true the manufacturing of North Korea made
supernotes would be impossible, as the cost of the printing hardware would exceed the value of
seized supernotes. A single new Giori printing machine costs more than the total value of
supernotes found so far. For example, Nigeria recently opened its second printing plant in Abuja
at a cost of more than $135 million for hardware alone.125Furthermore, North Korea may not
have the technical expertise to produce the notes. According to the Swiss Bundeskriminalpolizei,
"…its [North Korea’s] printing presses date back to the 1970s, North Korea is today printing its
own currency in such poor quality that one automatically wonders whether this country would

122 Kevin G. Hall, US Counterfeiting Charges Against N. Korea Based on Shaky Evidence
(McClatchy Newspapers, 10 January 2008) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/01/10/24521/uscounterfeiting-charges-against.html (accessed 10 December 2013).
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Elich, North Korea and the Supernote Enigma, p. 10.
36

even be in a position to manufacture the high-quality supernotes".126 Furthermore, the unique
microprint found on the $100 bill was reproduced on the supernotes so perfectly that even under
a microscope no difference is distinguishable.127 The gravure of an intaglio printing plate
requires many months intricate handwork and demands tens of thousands of dollars per plate; for
security reasons, this craft is a highly-confidential process.128 Therefore, an assumption could
be made that the possibility of DPRK producing supernotes can also be invalidated. North Korea
cannot procure the necessary material resources due to its financial crisis and trade sanctions and
lacks the talent to maintain printing facilities.129
On the other hand, in the event that North Korea has the necessary hardware to engage in
supernote counterfeiting, the fundamental question arises as to why North Korea is not making
more supernotes than its current numbers.

According to the Swiss Bundeskriminalpolizei,

“What defies logic is the limited, or even controlled, amount of ‘exclusive’ fakes that have
appeared over the years. The organization could easily circulate tenfold that amount without
raising suspicions.”130 It is believed that North Korea purchased an older Giori model printing
press during the 1970s, which could produce $50 million in about 5 hours.131 Additionally,
according to German banknote specialist Klaus W. Bender, the rate at which North Korea has
kept pace with the modifications made to US engraving plates since 1989 is difficult to explain,

126 Hall, US Counterfeiting Charges Against N. Korea, p. 3.
127 Elich, North Korea and the Supernote Enigma, p. 10.
128 Ibid., p. 10.
129 Elich, North Korea and the Supernote Enigma, p. 10.; Hall, US Counterfeiting Charges
Against N. Korea, p. 3.
130 Ibid., p. 10.
131 Ibid., p. 10.
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as these alterations to bill design are an expensive process that does not fit within DPRKs
economic means: “The counterfeiters immediately implemented each and every change to the
100-dollar bill.”132 Furthermore, it can be argued that North Korea cannot be responsible for the
manufacturing of supernotes, as the return on investment would not be economically feasible.
North Korea earns 40 percent of the face value of all notes counterfeited. 133 If one allocated the
$50 million in seizures over the 16-year period, applied the 60 percent discount, and considered
that many supernotes would be lost, it would imply revenues of only $1.25 million per year."134
The presence of supernotes is an undeniable reality and if North Korea cannot be held
liable for counterfeiting US currency one must question who is responsible for the manufacturing
and distribution of supernotes. According to currency expert Klaus Bender, the CIA is one such
entity that could be held accountable for manufacturing supernotes: covert funds for black
operations are produced by a press in a city just north of Washington, D.C. and the CIA then
conveniently blames the supernote-dilemma on Pyongyang.135 Others could be responsible,
such as China or another large entity with enough financial capital to fund a supernote operation,
however, not enough literature was found to support such claims. Considering the literature that
was reviewed, it can be assumed that dissenting opinions that argue North Korea does not have
the capacity to manufacture supernotes are marginal.136 The existence of supernotes, whether
DPRK manufactured or not, is a confirmed fact.

132 Bender, Supernotes., p. 4.
133 Asher, The North Korean Criminal State, p. 1.
134 Haggard and Noland, Follow the Money, p. 6
135 Bender, Supernotes, p. 5.
136 Ibid., p. 1; Elich, North Korea and the Supernote Enigma, p. 10; Haggard and Noland,
Follow the Money, p. 6; Hall, US Counterfeiting Charges Against N. Korea, p. 3.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Question, Aim, and Objectives
Research Question:
This thesis aims to answer two questions: Is North Korea manufacturing supernotes? If
so, to what extent are supernotes financing North Korea’s nuclear program?
In attempting to reach this aim the application of ACH will meet the following
objectives: the development of multiple hypotheses in an attempt to explain a supernote-nuclear
arms program link, assessing evidence with verifiable sources (academic journals, governmental
sources, news outlets, and texts from specialists in the study of currency production and nuclear
studies), providing a diagnostic weighing hypotheses against evidence, and refining the evidence
for inconsistencies and sensitivity. Should the acquired evidence prove to be substantial enough
to critically verify if North Korea has the means to produce supernotes by means of ACH, then a
secondary ACH evaluation will determine if supernotes are directly, partially, or not responsible
for DPRK’s financing of its nuclear arms program. A summary of alternatives that were
considered and why they were rejected will also be addressed. The milestones developed
throughout the process will also be noted and then serve as indicators for future analyses.
To aid in the rejecting of less than ideal hypotheses the use a computer program, ACH
2.0.5, developed by Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), in collaboration with Richards J. Heuer,
will be employed, so as to minimize user error in the fabrication and analysis of the hypothesesevidence matrix. Furthermore, by using this computer program, the amalgamation of qualitative
and quantitative analyses will be addressed. ACH is designated as a structured method that
adheres to a deliberate scientific method of assessment, with the application of ACH 2.0.5 the
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merger of qualitative and quantitative measures are combined to stimulate systematic
investigation via weighted inconsistency scales; credibility of referenced sources, relevance of
provided evidence, and multiple alternative hypotheses. The combination of these factors will
provide for a decision for the best fit hypothesis. By further studying the specific numerical
weight of inconsistency differentials even greater fine tuning of the applied evidence can be
manipulated so as to better isolate lynchpin, or hypothesis driving key variables.

3.2 Data Collection, Reliability Assessment, and Limitations
The sources used to obtain the data for hypotheses generation and evidence gathering
consisted of books, academic journals, and websites. Hardcopy texts were acquired from the
University of Texas at Arlington and El Paso, the Public libraries of Arlington and El Paso, as
well as, Southern Methodist University. Books about North Korean economic adversity and its
evolving nuclear risk were not difficult to acquire, however, hard copy literature about North
Korean manufactured supernotes were not easily found. The brunt of supernote research laid
upon academic journals, which did not provide much more information than books. However,
government and news sources found on the internet proved to be invaluable.
Whether it concerned books, academic journals, or websites, special attention was paid to
the perceived reliability of the source and academic contents. Every source of information that
provided critical evidence to support or reject a hypothesis was checked for reliability by
comparing its data with other sources. The websites have only been used if the source of the
information was clear and was deemed reliable for the kind of information sought. All websites
accessed for the sake of research were either official websites of the governments or from wellreputed news agencies and think-tanks.
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3.3 The Traditional Method of Intelligence Analysis
The application of structured analytical methods for complex intelligence analysis is a
method of contention within intelligence agencies, where intuitive processing is still the superior
technique.137 Non-structured intuitive approaches is considered the norm in the intelligence
community.138 The justifications to maintain this technique are numerous, as it is disputed that
the structured techniques of analytical processing cannot take into account for the infinite
number of variables involved in complex problems and that intuition is better.139
On the other side of the coin, greater implementation of structured techniques, such as
ACH, point out that intuitive processing is inherently flawed as it seldom acknowledges
appropriate attention to the provided information.140 Due to the qualitative nature of intelligence
analysis intuitive processing cannot be discounted. As qualitative information does not deal with
statistical information and the analyst must assess a great deal of information by applying
subjective intuitive processing, however, in doing so the analyst is subjugated to the perils of
cognitive limitations that expose vulnerabilities in judgment and understanding.

Although

structured techniques may have shortcomings, primarily the time involved in the application

137 Sundri Khalsa, The Intelligence Community Debate Over Intuition Versus Structured
Technique: Implications for Improving Intelligence Warning and Analysis (The Journal of
Conflict Studies, Vol. 29, 2009) http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/15234/
20838#re24 no24 (assessed 10 December 2013).
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Richards Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Center for the Study of IntelligenceCIA) p. 111.
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process, they have been scientifically proven to prevent intuitive pitfalls and are gaining greater
prevalence within the intelligence analysis domain.141
Despite the differences between the two prevailing schools of structured versus intuitive
analyses it can be argued that the one must go with the other. Structured technique expert and
former CIA analyst Morgan D. Jones asserts that structured technique aid in intuition
development as structured processing constructs mental paths that led to alternative
considerations.142 Failure to consider alternatives is the leading cause of flawed or incomplete
intelligence.143 Furthermore, structured analytic methods provides for creative outlets with
experience. As rational processing becomes well-exercised, it requires less mental effort and can
therefore complement analytical intuition.144

3.4 What is ACH?
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses is an analytical instrument developed in the 1970’s
by Richards J. Heuer, a former CIA methodology specialist. Heuer dedicated a process of
decision making via scientific means by acknowledging the inherent strengths and weaknesses of
the human mind and how it processes information.145 ACH concentrates on a process-oriented
method that facilitates in reducing cognitive biases and aids in preventing unwanted surprises
that would otherwise be unforeseeable.146 Furthermore, because of its thoroughness, it is

141 Khalsa, The Intelligence Community Debate Over Intuition Versus Structured Technique.
142 Ibid.
143 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p.7.
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145 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 95.
146 Ibid., p. 95.
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particularly appropriate for controversial issues when analysts want to leave an audit trail to
show what they considered and how they arrived at their judgment.147
ACH’s adherence to a scientific process is appropriate for critical or controversial issues
when analysts cannot afford to be wrong. Intelligence analysis cannot guarantee a correct
solution to prevent a potential calamity. ACH does, however, ensure an enhanced process of
analysis via a series of steps to aid in the deterrence of common analytical biases. Analytic
biases are easy to form and extraordinarily difficult to overcome.148 The wrong mental mindset
is based on first impressions, partial information, and sometimes faulty assumptions, which then
gains credence as analysts encounter more data that reinforces their mindset.149 Impressions
often remain with the analyst’s thoughts even after the evidence has been discredited.150 Given
time pressures, it is easy for an analyst to jump to conclusions and as more information becomes
available, the analyst is increasingly inclined to select that which supports their lead hypothesis
and ignore or reject information that is inconsistent with the lead hypothesis.151 This mindset is
derived from a need to impose order on our environment; analysts seek and often believe they
find causes for what are actually accidental or random phenomena.152 Furthermore, analytical
hazards tend to embrace “groupthink,” where the analyst assimilates information to agree with

147 Ibid., p. 95.
148 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 112; Randy Pherson, Overcoming Analytic
Mindsets: Five Simple Techniques, (National Security Law Society, 2005) http://www.pherson.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/00C.-Article-Overcoming-Analytic-Mindsets.pdf (assessed 14
May 2014), p. 1.
149 Pherson, p. 1.
150 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 115.
151 Pherson, p. 1.
152 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 127.
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others.153 This analytical hazard frequently incorporates the “availability” rule, where analysts
judge the probability of an event by the ease with which they can imagine relevant instances of
similar events or the number of such events that they can easily remember.154
Avoiding these analytical hazards increases the chances of obtaining a better explanation
of past and present events, and forecasting future events while simultaneously leaving a record of
evidence applied in the decision making process and how this evidence was interpreted.155
Special attention can be used to prevent these biases by challenging key assumptions, identifying
and overcoming mental mindsets, being aware of the absence of evidence, generating
alternatives, and reducing the chance of surprise.156 The methodical protocol of structured
analysis can seem cumbersome with lots of rules and preventative measures to ensure in a
superior evaluation, however,

3.5 What is Intuitive Analysis?
Process oriented analyses, such as ACH, encourage a deliberate, conscious activity that is
guided by rational thought. Reflective surveying of all alternatives and the listing of pros and
cons are carefully weighed to provide a range of probabilities that can be systematically
explained so as to reduce uncertainty and minimize analytical biases that would otherwise distort
the inquiry process and collection of evidence.157 However, this is not the case with intuitive

153 Pherson, p. 2.
154 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis., p. 161
155 Heuer, Improving Intelligence Analysis with ACH, (Center for the Study of Intelligence,
1999) p. 2.
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157 Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious, (Penguin Group, New
York, 2007), p. 4.
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analysis, where a ground-up approach is discounted in lieu for a top-down method; with
intuition, a satisficing explanation is most commonly generated prior to the gathering of critical
evidence: analysts think they already know the best solution.158 Contemporary psychologists
identify intuition as being systematically flawed because it ignores information, violates the laws
of logic, and is the source of many human disasters.159In other words, intuition is the
intelligence of the unconscious, without thinking, where the satisficed hypothesis is likely to
work in the situation.160
To better understand intuition is to also identify it without comparison to process
oriented analyses, such as ACH. Recent advances in cognitive science and artificial intelligence
suggests that the irrational implications of intuition are no longer outside the realm of scientific
study.161 Intuitive processes evolve from long experience and learning and consists of a mass
of facts, patterns, concepts, techniques; such mental impressions are deemed formal
knowledge.162 Intuition is not the opposite of rationality or rigorous analytical processing, nor is
it a random process of thinking. It is a sophisticated form of reasoning honed over years of
experience with a solid and complete grasp of details of a particular subject.163 However, unlike
analytic processes, such as ACH, intuitive analysis is a ‘synthetic’ psychological function, where
fragmented data and experiences are amalgamated into an integrated picture, or a holistic

158 Ibid., p. 17.; Heuer, Improving Intelligence Analysis with ACH, p. 4.
159 Gigerenzer, p. 17.
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representation of reality transcending rational thought.164
Intuitive processing can be argued to be classified as a substantial research method by
adhering to six properties: subconscious, complexity, tempo, divorced from emotion, and subject
to bias, and its involvement in all decision-making. The first in this series of six identifies is that
intuition is drawn without conscious thought, from an internal reservoir without rationality, and
without understanding of how answers are derived.165 Although inexplicable, intuition deals
with systems that are more complex than those that can be figured out in our conscious minds
and permits an overcoming of limits of rationality in unstable environment.166This aids in the
explanation that intuition’s inherent unconscious and complex nature is automated in a
succession of smooth and quick bursts, compressing years of experience and knowledge into
split seconds; it can also be identified as an economy of effort.167 Compounding upon the
previous factor, it has been debated that emotional responses inhibit the quickness or economy of
intuition. Intuition is innately non-emotional, as factors such as fear, anxiety, and wishful
thinking retard intuitive progression and would negate the process. 168Overwhelming evidence
demonstrates that intuition is fraught with cognitive biases; yet it is also argued that intuition’s
similarity to rational analysis is merely that both are based upon perceptions and assumptions
that are not necessarily accurate and correct.169 However, the use of intuition is central to all
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decisions. In consideration to rational analysis, analytic processes cannot be used exclusively as
analysts are always influenced by intuition, namely in data acquisition and interpretation. 170

3.6 Three Key Contrasting Elements: ACH vs. Intuitive Analysis
Unlike conventional intuitive analysis methods, ACH refines consideration onto critical
evidence that focuses more attention on alternative explanations and brings out greater potential
awareness in any situation that is poor in data, but rich in possibilities. This ground-up approach
of evaluating alternative hypotheses provides additional guidance for modification in future
evidence collection and research, therefore lessening the stem of uncertainty in the absence of
plentiful evidence. Such a contrast in analytical methodology, when compared to intuitive
analysis, can be best acknowledged by addressing three key differential elements, as noted in the
following:
Three Key Elements that Differentiate ACH and Intuitive Analysis
-

ACH processes multiple possibilities, rather than finding evidence
for the first most favored solution. This ensures that alternative
hypotheses receive equal treatment.

-

ACH identifies and emphasizes items of evidence that have the
greatest diagnostic value in judging the relative likelihood a
hypotheses. In regards to intuition key evidence consistent with
multiple hypotheses are rarely considered and often ignored.

-

ACH involves seeking evidence to refute hypotheses. The most
probable hypothesis is usually the one with the least evidence

170 Ibid., p. 62.
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against it, not the one with the most evidence for it. Conventional
intuition entails looking for evidence to confirm a favored
hypothesis. 171
Although there is no reassurance that the application of ACH can promise to consistently
provide correct answers, it can guarantee that a proper process of analysis was executed via a
rational and systematic means that detours common analytic pitfalls, thus increasing the chances
of obtaining an affirmative response. Furthermore, with the employment of a deliberate means
of processing, this procedure delivers an audit trail that demonstrates the diagnosticity
.172 Should criticism in judgments develop the audit trail provided could be
studied by noting the matrix, where specific areas of disagreements can be brought to attention
and the origins of dispute can be cited to an ultimate source.173

3.7 Is ACH Methodology Superior to Intuitive Analysis?
As is often the case within the intelligence community, the information available is
typically ambiguous and incomplete, which requires a research method that validates an
appropriate process of analysis. ACH addresses a complex problem through a process of wellreasoned, analytical judgment. Conventional intuition tries to confirm a favored hypothesis
without validating a non-biased process of hypothesis generation and elimination; whereas, with
ACH any hypothesis that can’t be refuted needs to be taken seriously. 174 Applying intuition
seeks the most likely solution for a complex issue with available information from the point of

171 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 108, 109.
172 Ibid., p. 101.
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view of whether or not it supports this answer. Contrary to intuitive analysis, where evidence is
gathered after generating the most probable solution, ACH follows the fundamental precept of
scientific method by rejecting or eliminating hypotheses, while tentatively accepting only those
hypotheses that cannot be refuted. The most likely hypothesis is the one with the least evidence
against it, not the one with the most evidence for it. This simple switch in perspective forces the
analyst to ask questions and seek evidence that would not otherwise be considered.175 By using
ACH analysts are required to set aside preconceptions and seek for inconsistencies in the data
that may indicate a flaw in their reasoning. Disproving hypotheses with ACH, rather than
satisficing a conclusion, is an exercise in evaluation and process management, thus reducing
cognitive limitations and analyst bias.
Intelligence analysis is a complex application, which demands critical analytical
judgment that does not guarantee certainty.

In other words, there are no slam dunks in

forecasting future events no matter how reassuring evidence may prove; as was the case in 2002,
when former CIA chief George Tenet remarked when commenting on the certainty that Iraq had
WMDs. Despite the preponderance of intelligence information that encouraged the Bush
administration to invade Iraq, erroneous methods in evidence acquisition and analysis ultimately
yielded a false positive as no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons were found.
By applying an analytical model that provides an unbiased methodology for weighing
judgments false positives due to cognitive biases can be reduced. Analysts opting not to use a
methodology based on a process-oriented approach will often work intuitively to satisfy the most
likely explanation and then work backwards, where the ‘correct’ explanation is the first one that

175 Ibid., p. 37.
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is consistent with the evidence.176 The satisficing approach consequence is that numerous
explanations can be consistent with the evidence and, unless every reasonable alternative is
considered, an incorrect conclusion may be derived. Another frequent problem with using the
satisficing strategy includes the failure to generate appropriate alternative hypotheses.
Furthermore, application of satisficing tends to support conclusions that are often not thoroughly
interpreted from multiple facets. Also, intuition fails to acknowledge the consistency of the
evidence: the pertinence of evidence and its relationship between hypotheses.177
The application of an unbiased methodology from the collection of the best available
information for uncertain indicators is the ultimate goal for intelligence analysts, however,
minimizing predisposed notions tends to be rather difficult, as it is a natural predisposition that
with the absence of certainty analysts seek solutions that may best fit a particular model.
Accurate intelligence analysis requires accurate perceptions. Yet human perception is fraught
with common pitfalls.178 According to Heuer, these consequences of biased perception are
multifold:
-

“We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive”; meaning that,
by human nature, greater amounts of unambiguous information is
needed to recognize unexpected phenomena. Perception is not only
influenced by the content in which it occurs, but analysts are also
predisposed and pays particular attention to an unconscious list of
information and organizes this data due to past experiences,

176 Heuer, Improving Intelligence Analysis with ACH, p. 29, 35.
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Queensland, 2005), p. 2
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professional training, and cultural and organizational norms. This
tendency of perception of expectations is the chief inhibitor of nonbiased research.
-

“Mind-sets tend to be quick to form but resistant to change...new
information is assimilated to existing images.” As analysts form
ideas they are biased in favor to continually seeing that idea; the
mind-set or expectation concerning a certain phenomenon is used
to mold future phenomena. 179

The culmination of these most common of analytical pitfalls reaffirms that the initial
exposure of inaccurate perceptions continues to influence future behavior and decision making
even after more and better information is presented.

When provided with a plethora of

information it is the duty of the analyst to decipher if that data is relevant or not.180 This is a
difficult task, yet the use of a pragmatic management system will acknowledge the degree and
source of uncertainty, re-examine key problems non-incrementally, and expose alternative points
of view. Judging the relevance and value of evidence to determine possible outcomes demands a
formal model that not only minimizes analytic bias, but also addresses the diagnosticity of
evidence by eliminating analytical predispositions and also limiting the amount of necessary
evidence.181

3.7.1 More Information is Not Necessarily Beneficial

179 Ibid., p. 8-15.
180 Jǿsang and Pope, p. 1.
181 Ibid., p. 1.
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ACH aids in preventing an over-saturation of evidence that is not helpful in either
favoring or refuting the generated hypotheses. It is intuitive that with a greater preponderance of
information a greater margin of confidence can be obtained so as to more assuredly define a
satisfactory hypothesis. Information used in this context refers to the availability of material that
is applied in judgment construction. However, when addressing this dilemma in regards to
ACH, less is often more.
Intelligence analysis, similar to other professions requiring detail oriented data analysis,
must identify the most relevant items from a vast array of evidence to make a best judgment. For
example, a physician observes a patient and can make a large list of data that aids in making a
medical diagnosis, however, a much of the data may not be critical in determining the diagnosis.
The physician uses their specialized knowledge to develop hypotheses that would explain the
patients’ symptoms, conduct tests to collect additional information to test their hypotheses, and
ultimately make a diagnosis. Data collection and management is focused narrowly on pertinent
information.182
An anecdote to better elaborate the case of the physician having to make the proper
decision for treatment without demanding a barrage of tests to obtain a proper diagnosis,
requiring only the most critical information, involves a young boy and his preventable, yet
untimely death. The story is from psychologist and decision making expert Gerd Gigerenzer.183

182 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 63.
183 Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings, p. 20, 21.
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An Anecdote of a Doctor’s Decisions: When Too Much Information is Not Helpful
A boy named Kevin was pale, withdrawn, and was drastically underweight for his
age. He refused to eat and multiple maladies. His father moved out of the house and his
mother missed feeding him or tried to force-feed him junk food. A young doctor learned of
the child and took charge. He felt uncomfortable handling the frail child and limited any
invasive tests. A more caring environment was provided, where the child began to eat and his
condition improved. By attending to the most critical indicators that were responsible for the
boy’s ill health the young doctor provided a diagnosis with a promising recovery.
However, the young doctor’s superiors, unconvinced by his treatment without formal
medical protocol, demanded that a team of specialists investigate Kevin ailments and develop
a refined diagnosis. Kevin was subjected to a barrage of invasive tests that proved to be
inconclusive. Kevin, fell into deep anxiety under the stresses of these tests and relapsed into
poor health. He stopped eating again and to counter his absence of appetite a medical
specialist placed Kevin on a special intravenous feeding regime while resuming testing.
Kevin was overwhelmed and soon died without yielding any medical cause of death.
Figure 3-1. Doctor’s Anecdote - Less is More
Another example to better explain how an over-abundance of information may not
necessarily be beneficial to intelligence analysis is Heuer’s comparison to horserace
handicapping. The number of variables to determine a winning race horse is a lengthy list,
where only a small select few indicators from a hundred are commonly considered. Testing the
success rate of handicappers’ winning horses found that as more items of information were
analyzed confidence in choice making grew, yet their accuracy remained consistent. More
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information to assess possible winning factors did not necessarily yield in a greater rate of
winning accuracy, but merely aided in the level of confidence. Therefore, the assumption that
more information makes for a better determination of a hypothesis is not essentially a golden
rule, but rather, “it seems that the explicit formulation of hypotheses directs a more efficient and
effective search for information.”184
Understanding the relationship between the amount of information and accuracy of
judgment can briefly be best explained in two parts. The first is that after the minimum amount
of information is acquired, seeking additional information does not always aid in the
improvement of the accuracy in the determination of the correct hypothesis. Secondly, from a
psychological perspective, judgments are generally determined by a few dominant factors and
not by a systematic interpretation of gross information; “analysts actually use much less of the
information than they think they do.”185
The formulation of savvy information collection to yield in superior hypothesis
construction illustrates a major distinction between expert and novice problem solvers, the
former employs “forward reasoning”, rather than “backward reasoning”, typical of intuitive
thought. Forward thinking applies a small set of indicators from data to diagnosis, with a
structured process-based model for hypotheses construction.

Therefore, any quandary that

involves the identification and manipulation of large data sets must take into account the
analysts’ knowledge base to ascertain the critical components of information, as well as its

184 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 55.
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organization in the applied problem-solving model.186 Taking this psychological perspective
into account, the ACH model of analysis demonstrates the need for a ground-up, or “forward
reasoning”, approach demanding that the employment of critical indictors be applied, while
discounting superfluous aggregate data that would only pander the confidence of the analyst.
Even worse, the insistence of acknowledging and attempting to use non-critical data would go
beyond confidence adulteration and yield in a skewed assessment and would create false
hypotheses.

3.8 Is ACH the Proper Evaluation Tool for Studying Supernotes?
It is all too enticing to exercise only intuitive thought and proclaim that a direct link
exists between the persistent reoccurrences of supernotes associated with North Korea and then
seek evidence that deduces counterfeit currency as a means of financing the rogue nation’s
nuclear program. Yet, the absence of evidence to substantiate such a deduction could yield in the
formation of an incorrect hypothesis. Intuition may aid in the development of a hypothesis that
would correctly address the relationship between supernotes and North Korea’s nuclear
armament, however, the degree to which it may be helpful would be diminutive and consciously
so, as the preponderance for intuitive applications cannot be audited and are overwhelming
unreliable. The decision to employ a rigorous structure-oriented analytic approach would best fit
this scenario due to its situational logic, where the development of a North Korean nuclear
program funded by counterfeit US currency is unique and cannot be readily applied to concrete
theories or compared to other situations.

186 Arthur S. Elstein, et al., Evaluation & the Health Professions, (Harvard University Press,
1990), p. 18, 19.
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Intuition is develops from experience, however, research about the North Korean
supernote-nuclear dilemma is a new occurrence, thus disqualifying intuition from being a
superior method in the development of accurate and plausible hypotheses. Rather, on the other
end of the spectrum, such a situation involving multiple unknowns, with a prevalence of
inaccurate information and non-comparative history, would require a more sophisticated method
grounded in structure-oriented rational thought analysis, namely ACH.

3.9 The ACH Process
Most analysts intuitively seek their most likely answer or hypothesis, then look at the
available information from the point of view of whether or not it supports their answer. In the
event the evidence does not validate the analysts’ initial hypothesis, the analyst either rejects the
evidence as misleading or develops another hypothesis and goes through the same procedure
again: this is a satisficing strategy.187 ACH It takes far greater mental agility than listing
evidence supporting a single hypothesis and can be accomplished with a step-by-step outline.188
Step one identifies the possible hypotheses to be considered. Generating the correct
hypothesis is vital in garnering the correct answer. Selecting specific hypotheses for further
evaluation must be screened to be disproved from those that are merely unproven. An unproven
hypothesis merits no evidence to be correct, whereas, a disproved hypothesis is negated by
evidence that it is wrong. The elimination of unproven hypotheses yields in biases in subsequent
analysis.189 Furthermore, it is during this step that a group of analysts with different

187 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 96.
188 Ibid., p. 96.
189 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p.96-98.
56

perspectives brainstorm various the possibilities.190 This step, however, was omitted as
knowledgeable analysts with compounded knowledge of North Korea, supernotes, and nuclear
arms proliferation were not readily available. In place of fellow brainstorming analysts the
implementation of decision making models were used. Hypotheses generation was initiated
using a combination of two methods that include problem restatement and a reasoning checklist.
Problem restatement aided in defining the hypotheses. The goal of problem restatement
is to expand our thinking about the problem, not to solve it, with a five-step process:
paraphrasing the hypotheses, reversing the meaning of the hypotheses, restating the hypotheses
in a larger context, redirecting the focus, and asking why of the initial problem statement. 191 For
example, when formulating a hypothesis that addresses whether or not North Korea is producing
supernotes using Jones’ method the process starts by paraphrasing the problem: “How are
supernotes used to develop North Korea’s nuclear program?” is adjusted to “How is North
Korea’s nuclear program using supernotes?”; trying to say the same thing with different words
puts a slightly different spin on the meaning and encourages new insight. 192 The next step turns
the problem on its head, where the initial problem is reversed to ‘How is North Korea funding its
nuclear program without supernotes?’. Step three broadens the focus: ‘How else is North Korea
using supernotes?’. Step four changes the focus: ‘How can we eliminate supernotes?’. The
initial problem, ‘How are supernotes used to develop North Korea’s nuclear program?’ is issued
a why query and responds, ‘because supernotes are being used to fund North Korea’s emergent
nuclear program’. The restatement to the response would be: ‘How to prevent supernotes

190 Ibid., p. 96.
191 Morgan D. Jones, The Thinker’s Toolkit (Three Rivers Press, 1998), p. 64.
192 Ibid., p. 64.
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funding of North Korea nuclear development?’. Repeat the why query: ‘because, an emerging
North Korean nuclear power is an international threat.’ Repeat the restatement: ‘How North
Korea becoming nuclear power?’ Repeat the why query: ‘because, North Korea is using illicit
means to fund its nuclear program.’ Repeat restatement: ‘How to halt North Korean illicit
activities?’. These steps apply a series of why questions to formulate a new problem based on the
answer and is repeated until a richer understanding of the problem emerges; this divergent
technique stimulates additional alternatives that may have otherwise been overlooked.193
The reasoning checklist further refines the problem and formally develops hypotheses
with an eight-step process that identifies the purpose of the reasoning. This checklist includes:
thinking about the purpose or objective of what is to be accomplished, stating a concise question
to identify the purpose, justify assumptions, consider alternative points of view, seek evidence,
clarify key concepts, draw a conclusion, and consider consequences.194 Similar to the Problem
Restatement method, the Reasoning Checklist applies a divergent strategy to seek addition
insight, however, unlike the Jones method Paul and Elder’s Reasoning Checklist also implements
a convergent strategy by drawing conclusions from inferences. 195 Upon brief consideration it
was determined that dividing the ACH process into two sets would best serve in assessing the
possible production of supernotes by North Korea and determining the extent these supernotes
are linked to North Korea’s nuclear program. Implementing the reasoning checklist yielded three
alternative hypotheses for the first ACH analysis: North Korea is printing supernotes, North
Korea is NOT printing supernotes, and North Korea is deceiving and denying its supernote

193 Ibid., p. 66-67.
194 Linda Elder and Richard Paul, Analytic Thinking (The Foundation for Critical Thinking,
2007), p. 12.
195 Ibid., p. 13, 17.
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operation.
The second step of the ACH process is to make a list of evidence for and against each
hypothesis; this section refers to all the aspects that influence hypothesis judgments.196 Such
influencing factors should not be limited to concrete evidence, but also personal assumptions or
logical deductions. Each hypothesis is addressed by what must have happened or is still
happening to make the hypothesis true. Furthermore, analysts must pay special attention to the
absence of evidence; what is omitted but should be present to make the hypothesis true.197
To ensure that the assessment does not rest on flawed hypotheses, rechecking assumptions
can be valuable.198 Writing down one’s assumptions forces analysts to think critically about each
assumption; as assumptions are studied some assumptions will fall apart, transforming themselves
from Key Assumptions to Key Uncertainties.199

Another advantage of performing a key

assumptions check is that while assumptions are mostly correct, the process forces the analyst to
consider under what circumstances they might not hold up, thereby sensitizing them to data they
otherwise might have ignored.200
The third ACH step is the most analytical and is the step that makes ACH differ from
intuitive approaches to intelligence analysis. The combination of hypotheses and evidence are
married in a matrix in horizontal rows and vertical columns. By working horizontally across the
matrix the evidence will judge the consistency of each hypothesis. The weighing of evidence to

196 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 99.
197 Ibid., p. 99.
198 Pherson, p. 2.
199 Ibid., p. 2.
200 Ibid., p. 2.
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each hypothesis provides diagnosticity, the key difference between ACH and intuition.201
Should a particular evidence item prove to be consistent with all of the hypotheses, it has no
diagnostic value.202
Step four refines the matrix, reconsiders the hypotheses, identify gaps in the evidence that
may need to be filled to refute hypotheses, checks the consistency of evidence ratings, and
solicits additional input. It is in this section that the analyst identifies and compares different
types of evidence, with a special focus on the most diagnostic evidence.203 By refining the
matrix consider rewording and combining hypotheses, so as to make for finer distinctions.204
Reconsidering evidence also occurs in this step; adding more evidence that may influence the
updated hypotheses or deleting evidence that is of non-diagnostic value.205
Step five compares the conclusions about the relative likelihood of the hypotheses. Work
down the matrix for each hypothesis and note all of the evidence for or against each hypothesis;
the analyst must seek to disprove, rather than confirm hypotheses. 206 Note the hypothesis
column with the least number of negative indicators. The hypothesis with the fewest negative
connotations is most likely to be true and greater numbers of negative connotations is more
likely to yield a hypothesis that is not true, whereas a hypothesis that is inconsistent with all
evidence should be rejected. 207 Positive connotations, indicating that evidence is consistent in

201 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 100.
202 Ibid., p. 100-102.
203 Ibid., p. 103.
204 Ibid., p. 103.
205 Ibid., p. 103.
206 Ibid., p. 103.
207 Ibid., p. 104.
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accepting a hypothesis, although important, is not as important as rejecting it. The hypothesis
with the most number of positive connotations does not necessarily make it the most likely to be
true. The matrix serves as a record and provides an audit trail demonstrating how conclusions
were made.208
Steps six, seven, and eight are not as technically involved with matrix development.
Rather, it is in these sections that alternative explanations and interpretations that may cause
evidence to be incomplete and misleading are considered.209 Critical assumptions and how the
conclusions are dependent upon the validity of these assumptions are reviewed considering how
conclusions would be affected if key evidence or arguments were wrong or subject to a different
interpretation.210 Conclusions are then reported, which also includes a discussion of alternatives
that were considered and why they were rejected, as well as, including the possible need of
contingency or fallback plans in case one of the less likely alternatives turns out to be true.211
Lastly, the last step identifies milestones for future observation that may indicate events are
taking a different course than expected. As situations may change, do not regard the conclusions
as a permanent statement that is inflexible; as more information is presented hypotheses also
change.212

208 Ibid., p. 103-105.
209 Ibid., p. 105.
210 Ibid., p. 106.
211 Ibid., p. 107.
212 Ibid., p. 107.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Two ACH applications critically compared the hypotheses, whether DPRK is producing
supernotes and the extent to which supernotes finance North Korea’s emerging nuclear arms
threat. The generation of matrices was comprised of 17 evidence indicators that were assessed
for Matrix One and 20 for Matrix Two. The process was applied by using the PARC ACH 2.0.5
computer software system, which provided a weighted inconsistency score based on the above
mentioned factors.
In tabulating the data the disproval of hypotheses rather than proving them aided in
selection of the most reasonable hypothesis. Negative scores furthest away from zero are to be
disproved as these hypotheses have more inconsistencies from evidence indicators; likewise,
scores closer to zero are not as likely to be disproved, as they have less inconsistency markings
in the hypothesis column of the matrix. The greater the difference of the weighted inconsistency
scores between hypotheses will aid in the significance of variability and confidence in hypothesis
selection; larger differences in scores between hypotheses suggest polar variances and small
comparative differences in weighted inconsistencies suggestion greater similarities between the
hypotheses. Furthermore, these scores aid in providing conclusions about the relative likelihood
of each hypothesis as scores farther away from zero have greater inconsistencies when compared
evidence indicator to hypothesis.
Each evidence indicator was graded with three confidence types that would identify
evidence as a fact, logical deduction, or assumption. Evidence labeled as a Fact are wellsupported with multiple sources that is generally highly credible and relevant.

Logical

Deduction is not as well-endowed as evidence identified as a Fact. For the sake of this study,
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Logical Deduction must be supported by sources that provide nodes of differing information that
when combined creates a conclusion based on what you already know from the provided
sources. Labeling each evidence indicator, therefore, adds pertinence to key arguments, as to
whether it requires special attention or not. Although not all evidences can be facts, however,
although logical deduction and assumptions may not receive as much analytical attention
caveats, or warnings, can be identified with evidence indicators and serve as milestones for other
analysts to observe.

Assumptions are unproven remarks with reduced credibility.

More

supported assumptions increases its credibility.
Credibility and Relevance also assess the diagnosticity of evidence and hypotheses with
ranking systems, so as to better identify evidence that may require closer analysis. Credibility is
assessed to determine reliability and credibility of indicator evidence and is measured in high,
medium, and low settings. Higher ratings provide more consistent and honest evidence. When
labeling an evidence indicator for credibility, high ratings are given to evidence that has a proven
history of providing accurate information regularly, such as a well-respected periodical for
example. Consistent delivery of accurate news is only half of credibility measurements, as the
information must trustworthy in order to be considered worthy to of high markings. A low
credibility rating is often misrepresentative and is not well supported by other sources.
Relevance, unlike credibility, determines the importance or gravity of the evidence. Just
like with credibility, relevance is also measured in high, medium, and low rankings. These
rankings classify evidence indicators with an affective capacity; in other words, a high ranking
has a greater inclination for influence, whereas a low ranking has little or no affective value and
few analysts would care to give it any mind. One assesses the relevance of the evidence to the
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question being analyzed, not relevance to each individual hypothesis. The analyst asks whether
this evidence is central to the analytical judgment that must be made or only indirectly related.

4.1 Data Set One
After tabulating the data into the matrix the results yielded scores of -23.656 for
Hypothesis 1, H1, that North Korea is not printing high quality US currency and -4.828 for
Hypothesis 2, H2, the contrast alternative to H1. Hypothesis 3, H3, that North Korea is engaging
in deception and denial scored -10.0. As the score for H1 is considerably farther from zero than
H2, it can be assessed that H2 had more tabulated inconsistencies and fewer consistent scores in
its hypothesis column. The large disparity between hypotheses strongly suggests that the
provided evidence indicators has yielded in a definitive difference between the hypotheses.
Hypothesis number 2, H2, is the most reasonable hypothesis, as it has the smallest inconsistency
score. In addition, it should also be noted that H3’s D&D motive had a weighted inconsistency
score that was about half that of H1; therefore, according to the inconsistency scores North is
most likely to be printing supernotes and is twice as likely to engage in acts of denial and
deception that would hide and misrepresent North Korea’s responsibility for supernotes. Note
the appendices for charts, tables, key assumption checks, and detailed evidence lists.

4.2 Data Set Two
After tabulating the data into the matrix the results yielded scores of -17.78 for
Hypothesis 1, H1, that supernotes are not responsible for the financing of North Korea’s nuclear
arms program, -3.41 for Hypothesis 2, H2, that supernotes are directly responsible, and -.71 for
Hypothesis 3, that supernotes are partially financing North Korea’s nuclear program. As the
score for H1 is considerably farther from zero than H2 or H3, it can be assessed that H2 had
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more tabulated inconsistencies and fewer consistent scores in its hypothesis column. The large
disparity between H1 versus H2 and H3 strongly suggests that the provided evidence indicators
has yielded in a definitive difference between hypotheses. Hypothesis number 3, H3, is the most
reasonable hypothesis, as it has the smallest inconsistency score.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS
Not all questions have definitive answers and in the absence of certainty ACH helps
differentiate between plausible answers, while objectively and systematically explaining the
most likely explanation by disproving hypotheses that are the least consistent when assessed with
the evidence. This study identified two sets of hypotheses to be analyzed. The first was a
qualifying analysis of ACH to assess whether North Korea is manufacturing supernotes and the
second analysis that assessed that degree of supernote-nuke involvement. This first ACH study
demonstrated that the evidence was diagnostically most consistent with the two hypotheses and
proved that North Korea is, in fact, generating supernotes. The second ACH analysis determined
the grade of responsibility, that the supernotes are used in the financing of North Korea’s nuclear
arms program. Additional information detailing which sources were used for particular evidence
indicators, as well as evidence lists and ACH matrices can be found in the appendices

5.1 Is North Korea Capable of Producing Supernotes?
In regards to the first ACH analysis, the similarities of the evidence can be grouped into
categories of relevance, of course the most important being evidence numbers E1, E2, and E3:
North Korea has supernote paper (E1), paper (E2), and ink (E3).

These lynchpins that

acknowledge that the mechanical hardware and additional components to make supernotes is
most vital in ensuring supernote production. The absence of any of these evidence factors would
immediate negate North Korea’s capacity to print supernotes. In regards to credibility, sources
that provided this evidence came from a combination of academic journals, news outlets, and
governmental sources.
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Other indicators that could be acknowledged as less important include E9 and E4 [E9:
DPRK does not have printing talent; and E4: DPRK cannot afford supernote printing hardware].
Although these factors are important in counterfeiting, the assessment yielded a consistent
marking for the E4-H1 heading, as the relative importance of acquiring the necessary funds to
purchase supernote quality counterfeiting machinery is less relevant than actually having it [H1:
DPRK is NOT printing supernotes].

Furthermore, state funded black enterprise has more

expendable funds for grand operations that would otherwise be impossible for private non-state
actors. An inconsistent marking can be found in the E9-H2 heading, as it was reasoned that the
procurement of the physical hardware and printing material is more difficult to obtain than a
skilled money fabricating specialist, therefore the low relevance marking [H2: DPRK is printing
supernotes].
Evidence factors E5-E7 acknowledge the economic motivators for printing supernotes,
with the most critical of these indicators inquiring whether or not North Korea is producing
supernotes to act as a catalyst for the advancement of other state managed illicit activities [E5:
DPRK delegates transferring supernotes abroad; E6: DPRK cash only economy; E7: Supernotes
are catalysts for illicit activity]. Such activities include, but are not limited to the counterfeit
production of commercial goods, or more importantly fraternizing with rogue nations or
terrorists sects by dealing military grade weapons, munitions, and nuclear arms technologies.
E10 encompasses these activities with the greatest diagnostic disparity between hypotheses,
namely H1 versus H3 [E10: DPRK needs supernotes to purchase military arms/technology from
rogue nations; H3: DPRK has supernote deception and denial motives].
The last piece of evidence mentioned, E8, addresses the disregard of North Korea’s
manufacturing of supernotes during a US Department of the Treasury meeting with South
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Korean government officials on, as noted by Edward Royce in his staff report to House Foreign
Affairs Committee chairman Tony Lantos. The forsaking of this evidence by ROK was so as to
minimize diplomatic friction in the peninsula. It was during this time that North Korea badgered
the US and asserted that its presence in the sixth round of six-nation talks would be non-existent
unless financial sanctions imposed in 2005 would be lifted. South Korea’s decision to turn the
other check was an exercise in diplomatic patience and to prevent any aggravation of potential
hostile acts from DPRK.
As each of these evidence factors are evaluated, the most diagnostic evidence about
whether North Korea can print supernotes is its possession of machinery to make counterfeit
bills. These are the hypotheses driving key variables, or lynchpins. Without these variables
North Korea would be unable to create supernotes. However, the variables that could be
identified as another lynchpin, but not as dynamic as compared to E1-3, is factor E7 supernotes
are a catalyst for the propagation of additional illicit activities. It can be argued that without the
stimulus of supernotes the cycle of acquiring additional monetary funds from state sponsored
illicit activities could not be collected as quickly, and thus preventing an expedited mission of
nuclear arms development.
From an alternative perspective, should the other hypothesis be true, where North Korea
is not producing supernotes, the evidence must be confounded for evidence factors E1-E3.
Although some reports claim that the hardware currently possessed by North Korea to
manufacture supernotes is obsolete and unable to create counterfeit bills overwhelming evidence
from multiple sources of various types proves the contrary213. The possibility that North Korea

213 Kevin G. Hall, US Counterfeiting Charges Against N. Korea Based on Shaky Evidence
(McClatchy Newspapers, 10 January 2008) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/01/10/24521/us68

has not, and is not currently, manufacturing supernotes is a possibility and should not be
discounted.
5.2. Are Supernotes Responsible for the DPRK’s Nuclear Program?
Part Two of this two-part analysis compares three hypotheses: first, supernotes are not
responsible for North Korea’s development of nuclear arm programs; second, supernotes are
directly responsible; and third, that supernotes are partly responsible. In this second analysis
fourteen pieces of evidence are held to be of importance. The evidence disproves both H1 and
H2 with greater inconsistencies than H3, therefore, making H3 the superior choice among the
three [H1: Supernotes are NOT financing DPRK's nuclear program; H2: Supernotes are
DIRECTLY financing DPRK's nuclear program; H3: Supernotes are PARTIALLY financing
DPRK's nuclear program].
Similarly to the first analysis that determined whether or not North Korea has been
producing counterfeit bill this second part can also cluster evidence indicators into influential
themes. The most instrumental and relevant groupings includes evidence numbers E8, E10, and
E12; these are the lynchpin or hypothesis driving variables [E8: State Sponsored Illicit Acts,
E10: Business Allies with Rogue Nations, E12: DPRK Actively Printing Supernotes]. These
indicators express direct involvement with state managed illicit activities of the highest caliber
and demonstrate that supernotes are an effective vehicle to perpetuate the cyclic funds generation
to finance a quickly maturing nuclear threat. The relevance of these indicators are deemed

counterfeiting-charges-against.html (accessed 10 December 2013).; Elich, North Korea and the
Supernote Enigma, p. 10.; David L. Asher, The North Korean Criminal State, Its Ties to
Organized Crime and Possibility of WMD Proliferation (Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online,
no. 05-92A), p.1.; Klaus W. Bender, Supernotes: Das Geheimnis der gefaelschten Dollarnoten,
(Frankfurter Allegemeine, 1 August 2007), p.1.
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mostly as high and originate from varied sources: books, government bodies, and academic
journals. Queries that may doubt the credibility and relevance of these indicators resulting in
misunderstandings are inhibited by the prevalence of information that historically catalogues
North Korea’s exploits within grossly illicit behavior. However, should evidence indicators E8,
E10, and E12 prove to be misleading the most justifiable explanation would be that government
managed black enterprises fail to exist within North Korea; if it were to be proven that
supernotes are not responsible for DPRK’s nuclear programs development then the
accompanying behavior of illicit activities would more than likely also fail to exist.
Evidence indicators E1, E2, E3, E4, and E7 share a common premise that North Korea’s
fractured economic status is crippled due to a combination of large trade deficits, subjugation to
years of austere environmental conditions that ruined its already flailing agricultural harvests,
and loss of monetary sponsors, primarily Soviet Russia after 1990 [E1: DPRK Trade Deficit; E2:
DPRK Agriculture Crisis; E3: Loss of Soviet Aid; E4: Less Chongryon Aid, E7: Cash Driven
Economy]. The result of such economic crises has made for a broken relationship with the
globe, as the international community perceives North Korea to be too great of a financial risk to
be worth investing, thereby creating a cash driven economy.

Economists agree that the

combined financial failures of North Korea are exacerbated with its pursuit to maintain its Juche
and Songun policies, E5.
The enactment of numerous sanctions have been imposed upon North Korea due to its
adherence to Juche and Songun and policies, which not only further encourages the promulgation
of illicit acts, but does so with the detriment of its general population who endure terrible human
rights violations. As North Korea denies itself the means to legitimately foster fair business
trade in lieu for nuclear arms development, it is actively breaking international trade sanctions
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and arm treaties, as demonstrated in E9 and E13 [E9: Treaty & Sanction Violation; E13:
Supernotes seized from DPRK diplomats]. Furthermore, North Korea’s persistent manipulation
and reactivation of the Yongbyon facility, E6, to further its nuclear fissile capacity is a direct
violation of multiple accords. This brazen disregard to imposed sanctions and severing of nonproliferation treaties perpetuates North Korea’s portrayal as a country that cannot be trusted, thus
further requiring a need to seek alternative modes of economic influx. The evidence-hypotheses
analysis demonstrates that the generation of supernotes cannot solely support the monetary
demands of North Korea, but rather acts as a facilitator acting as a cog in the illicit money
making machine to advocate its ‘military first’ policy is ultimately partly responsible for the
financing of its nuclear arms programs.
Although highly unlikely, in the event that North Korea is not producing supernotes and
that its nuclear program is receiving no benefit of such illicit activity it is always advised that a
contingency be addressed to acknowledge how lynchpin indicators can create for this type of
scenario. In order for North Korea’s nuclear program to be independent from the influences of
supernotes would necessitate that North Korea abstain from engaging in evidence indicators of
high relevance, specifically halting its reliance on state sponsored illicit acts to procure funds to
stimulate its GDP. In simpler terms, no supernotes means no nuclear program. However, for
North Korea to support a nuclear program without the benefit of supernotes it would have to
sacrifice more than just the counterfeit money.

Additional sacrifices that may have to be

surrendered are factors that inhibit international commerce. To absolve the nation of its deep
trade deficits would demand that the forfeiting of its illicit money generating activities so as to
better garner the international trust of global business. Furthermore, the ideological premise of
self-containment must also be sacrificed as well as its defiance to maintain trade sanctions and
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energy treaties, but for all this to occur would insinuate a regime change as too many factors
must be adulterated to make way for the slight possibility of advocating a possibility of
envisioning H1 to come to fruition.
It is much more likely, according to weighted inconsistency scores, that supernotes are
directly responsible for the financing North Korea’s nuclear program than having no
responsibility at all. The possibility that North Korea’s nuclear program is directly financed by
supernotes, H2, would demand reciprocal stipulations of evidence indicators when compared to
H1. Instead of attempting to garner the trust of the international community with appeasement
so as to create a characteristic of nuclear responsibility, H2 would contrast by intensifying its
production of supernotes and simultaneously incurring greater relations with rogue nations with
heightened trade of military arms and technical fissile expertise, thus further violating
internationally imposed sanctions and treaties, and in doing so would also make North Korea
even more far-removed and isolated from the international community.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
North Korea is a growing nuclear threat that is compromising international diplomacy
and security. This self-imposed isolated nation has a tenuous relationship with the international
community where its continuous saber-rattling is keeping the world walking on diplomatic egg
shells. Its mission to expedite the development of a nuclear arms program has yielded exhaustive
measures to inhibit the further advancement of North Korean nuclear weaponry, primarily
through the application of sanctions. However, the implementation of greater economic
restrictions has urged North Korea to venture into clandestine ventures to finance its frail
economy. North Korea is engaging in illicit acts, including producing supernotes, to acquire
greater monetary funds to support its Songun policy. The evidence-hypotheses analysis has
demonstrated that high-quality counterfeit US supernotes could be a powerful catalyst in
fulfilling DPRK’s nuclear objectives.
It can be remarked from the second ACH analysis that the evidence provided on the topic
of North Korea’s fabrication of supernotes demonstrates that supernotes could act as a catalyst
aiding in further growth of illicit state managed crime, as well as nuclear arms development.
Evaluation on the manufacturing of supernotes has revealed that as greater volumes of
supernotes are manufactured the occurrence of illicit activities also increase, further
compromising international safety.

Unfortunately, halting North Korea’s manufacturing of

supernotes would only retard but not cease DPRK’s atomic mission, as the ACH evaluation has
demonstrated that counterfeit US money is only partly responsible for the financing of its nuclear
program.
The existing body of academic literature on North Korea and its production and
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proliferation of US counterfeit currency is not well-developed. Intelligence in regards to this
matter is not plentiful and is largely subjective. Although the occurrence of information about
North Korea and its nuclear threat is plentiful, what is not found are objective analyses that detail
the reasoning for DPRK’s past, present, and future behaviors. The employment of ACH to study
the North Korea’s nuclear threat-supernote relationship provided a simple model to think about a
complex problem.

This application of well-reasoned, analytical judgments systematically

evaluated evidence to reject hypotheses that contains too much inconsistent data. Perhaps the
absence of such substantial studies that can objectively confirm or deny the validity of the
supernote-nuclear link is due to importance of this matter, the judgment to whether or not such a
supernote-nuke link exists and that the DPRK nuclear threat is so important, that analysts cannot
afford to be wrong. The risk that an assessment error could yield in a false hypothesis where a
regional dilemma could be more intensely studied instead of the possibility of an impending
international nuclear crisis. With so many unknown factors about DPRK it is especially
challenging to rationally and systematically develop an objective forecast as to what North Korea
will do next.
The choice to use ACH in exposing a supernote-nuke link proved to be crucial, not only
as the presence of quantitative systematic models used to study this matter is seldom found, but
also stimulated and guided in greater inquiry generation, to methodically evaluate evidence and
hypotheses. Amalgamating structural analysis with intuition facilitated in the inquiry process,
but did not force open a closed mind. Although ACH identified and questioned assumptions that
were responsible for evidence gathering and hypotheses generation, failure in considering
hypothetical alternatives with accompanying evidence was due mostly in part not because of the
insufficiency of available data, but rather the lack of creative thought to identify unforeseen
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outcomes, as demonstrated by the methods prescribed by Jones, Paul, and Elder. The intuitive
process for this research was aimed primarily for evidence collection, where critical data was
collected should it have an impact on the judgments about the hypotheses, recall ‘problem
restatement’ and ‘checklist for reasoning’.

This portion of the ACH process is the least

scientific, that is, until the evidence is weighed when analyzing hypotheses. However, without
initially entering the appropriate data the result will be skewed or completely false.
For example, the milestone provided in Matrix 1 revealed that without lynchpins E1-E3
[DPRK has supernote printing press, paper, and ink]. North Korea would not be able capable of
producing supernotes. In the event that DPRK does not have such counterfeiting capacities then
it should not have the hardware and material; this encourages the analyst to use creative and
intuitive means to seek evidence that may justify such a belief, however, if no such evidence is
found then the substantiation of the most valid hypothesis choice is suspect. The balance
between structured analysis and creative judgment with intuition creates a systematic approach
that must be exercised with caution as the results yielded, despite efforts to minimize cognitive
biases, are dependent on the data entered. The payoff from ACH comes from its analytical
process, not from the precise probability calculations for each hypothesis. Ultimately, the final
judgment as to which hypotheses are least valid, thus leaving one best choice hypothesis, is made
by the analyst and not by the matrix. Therefore, the use of ACH as a tool to explain past,
present, or future events or to justify alternative courses of action is not absolute.
Other considerations to be deliberated, involving ACH’s creative and intuitive grey-area,
include lynchpin evidence from Matrix 2, namely E8, E10, and E12 [E8: State Sponsored Illicit
Acts; E10: Business Allies with Rogue Nations; E12: DPRK Actively Printing Supernotes]. It is
with the assessment of the analyst that the weight of this evidence, when studied as a group and
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individually, yields in the same conclusion that DPRK manufactured supernotes are partly
responsible for the development of North Korea’s nuclear program. To further explain, if North
Korea is not actively manufacturing supernotes, past production of counterfeits may have
influenced in its business relations with rouge nations and its continued management of state
sponsored crime.

Should one, or all, of these three lynchpins prove to be true, then the

possibility of a supernote-nuke link would be more likely than not. Although this decision was
greatly based on empirical evidence founded on the credibility and relevance of each evidence
artifact, it was an initial intuitive inspiration that founded these factors. Without applied intuition
to consider evidence, the decision to refute more inconsistent hypotheses would have been
compromised; the intuitive process has generated a large discrepancy in the grade of supernotenuke responsibility, therefore strengthening the inconsistency score of the H1, supernotes are not
financing North Korea’s nuclear program.
In regards to North Korean manufactured supernotes and its relationship with the creation
and evolution of a new nuclear power, three considerations have been made.

The first

consideration that could affect the judgment outcomes is acknowledging the series of recent
events in the past quarter-century. These dates are responsible for altering the supernote-nuke
link assumption. It can be assumed that the number of offensives by North Korea involving
military confrontations, diplomatic violations, or arms testing and trading is increasing with an
increased frequency for saber-rattling and diplomatic agitation. Historical indicators of offensive
nuclear strikes are limited, using North Korea’s past to dictate its future would prove to be
unreliable. Other nations or non-state actors with nuclear arms capabilities have not yet made
history in delivering an international nuclear catastrophe, therefore, there is no prescribed
method or existing model confront North Korea’s emerging nuclear power. North Korea’s
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supernotes are hastening its nuclear development, however, the weakness in this process is in
identifying if DPRK’s nuclear intentions are indeed hostile. According to its history North
Korea may have an increased number of offensive incidences, however, it is to be questioned
that the production of supernotes is relevant in this increase or vice versa.
The second consideration further addresses the effectiveness of imposing sanctions upon
North Korea. Evidence item E9 of Matrix 2 identifies high credibility and high relevance that
increased sanctions imposed upon North Korea is encouraging the production of supernotes,
therefore accelerating the development of North Korea’s nuclear program. Since the start of the
Korean War in 1950 the United States has limited contact with North Korea and has continuous
implemented sanctions to restrict trade. Decades of embargoes and international sequestration
has yielded the argument that further prohibitions will prove to be ineffective.
For more than 60 years Washington has tirelessly advocated that placing sanctions upon
North Korea will provide enough incentive to encourage the regime to modify its behavior for a
foreign policy that is more becoming of an international audience.

The gravity of this

consideration is substantial, as history has demonstrated chronic sanctioning has not yielded any
benefit in regards to the diplomatic strengthening of DPRK with the international community,
but rather the opposite. It was during the Clinton administration that relationships between
North Korea and with the US were more favorable than any other time in DPRK’s history. It is
during this time period that Clinton agreed to the first major easing of economic sanctions
against North Korea since 1953. Furthermore, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who
was the highest ranking US official to ever visit North Korea, facilitated in garnering greater
inter-peninsula relations between both Koreas. ACH prompted this political consideration, which
pleads that the DPRK supernote-nuke link could be mediated by negating the implementation of
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sanctions. However, it could also be contemplated that North Korea took advantage of this
relatively more submissive position to sow seeds for future international discontent, acquiring
the required material to later manufacture supernotes to aid in nuclear armament
At the same time, it could also be argued that as a nuclear disaster has not yet happened,
therefore, the sanctions imposed upon North Korea are effective in its ability to retard the
development of a North Korean nuclear threat and prevent a nuclear strike.

Diminished

commerce with the international business community has reduced North Korea’s exposure to
factors that would have otherwise made for a stronger North Korean nuclear threat. By
exercising sanctions against North Korea the argument that supernotes are responsible for the
armament of a nuclear DPRK continues to be debated.
The third consideration continues upon DPRK’s financial crisis by branching into its
foreign energy and agricultural dependency from other nations.

Similar to the previous

consideration, the implementation of sanctions and its responsibility in the development in a
supernote-DPRK nuke link, this consideration will discuss a WWII comparison between the US
and Japan. The Japanese occupation of northern French Indochina yielded in an American
embargo in 1940 prohibiting the exchange of metal and oil.214 Later, in 1941, the freezing of
Japanese national assets placed further strain on the Japan economy.215 The result was an
immobile nation that was unable to survive unless deceitful measures were implemented.
Similar to WWII era Japan, current North Korea is a nation with comparable
predicaments: an energy crisis, as a country that does not have sufficient petroleum reserves; and

214 The Road to Pearl Harbor: The United States and East Asia, 1915–1941(The National
Endowment for the Humanities) http://edsitement.neh.gov/curriculum-unit/road-pearl-harborunited-states-and-east-asia-1915-1941 (accessed 2 April 2014), p. 1.
215 Ibid.
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an agricultural crisis, as a country without sufficient mechanical farming power. Both nations
have experienced similar crises and have made the decision that for the sake of national
preservation the employment of a strong offensive strategy is better than a defensive
modification to placate the international community. For Japan the choice to maintain national
survival was to declare war on the US by bombing Pearl Harbor. The past decision made by
Japan can be compared with modern North Korea’s decision to aggressively confront the US, as
well as the international community, and the policies that are continuing imposing new
sanctions. North Korea’s development of a nuclear weapons capacity, like Japan’s bombing of
Pearl Harbor, is an attempt to exist and maintain its national authority. For more than 60 years
the greater part of the international community has been weaning North Korea from trade. The
years after the end of the Soviet Era further economically isolated North Korea with greater
financial challenges. Supernotes can be identified as a catalyst by acting as a life-support system
preventing North Korea from a more rapid death by trade attrition.
The final consideration identifies the presence of the CIA’s possible manipulation of
supernotes so as to create the premise that North Korea is creating supernotes. The speculation
of the CIA using DPRK manufactured supernotes as a patsy to fund black operations is not
impossible and the probabilities of such an event should not be discounted. Evidence concerning
this topic is rare, speculative, and originates from only a small handful of sources, namely
Bender, Elich, and Hall from the literature review section. This is a matter of high relevance, but
is not found to be frequently discussed as the credibility from the sources are moderate at best
and cannot assure analytical confidence. CIA denial and deception is the best fit for a wild card
when comparing the previous considerations that were raised after using ACH. ACH is very
limited in negotiating a possible CIA link to supernotes, as information to better explain this
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possibility is just not available from highly credible sources. The possibilities of a CIA cover-up
is possible, just not probable.
ACH is a structured analytical device that when combined with synthetic psychological
function, creative thought with intuition, makes for a rational and systematic designed tool. The
benefits of ACH have made for an auditable paper-trail to empirically support the sequence of
rules and data implementation showing that North Korea is most likely manufacturing supernotes
to aid the in its nuclear armament. However, the process to create an ACH has proved to be time
consuming. Furthermore, ACH is an effective tool for rejecting hypotheses when compared with
inconsistent factors; the evidence itself could not be explained with ACH, but weighed.
To improve upon the research performed and better assess the link of North Korean
supernotes and a nuclear armed DPRK several factors were addressed. The first is that ACH
demanded an overabundance of discrete judgments that did not easily fit a particular evidential
weight. For example, to consider whether the CIA is directly, partly, or not responsible for
supernotes funding North Korea’s nuclear program could fit into every category. In such a
situation the analyst would have to seek additional evidence that is more specifically aligned
with the demands of the hypotheses.
When giving extra attention onto potential lynchpin evidence, other important evidence
factors were overlooked. Evidence items indicating that multiple factors were responsible for the
occurrence of an event may not be given enough consideration. For example, it can be noted that
when analyzing Matrix 2 E8, DPRK is sponsoring illicit activities, this piece of evidence is a
multi-premise argument that closely identifies with several other evidence items and could be
further broken down into other evidence items. Doing so, however, would demand that the
analyst exercises more judgment in deciding whether or not the newly found piece of evidence to
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be worthy of comparative evidence-hypothesis weighing, which again echoes the problem
addressed previously, cognitive bias. The rigid adherence for discrete judgments in ACH resulted
in a detached analysis, where the standard ACH framework failed to acknowledge the multilayer or subordinate structure of evidence.
ACH can study and explain past, present, and future events, but the evidence used in the
process is static, like a photograph in time. Previously, the introduction of new evidence to
matrices could be cumbersome and confusing, as the analyst would have to construct another
matrix. Presently, however, ACH computer software updates new information and weighs for
inconsistencies to reject hypotheses. ACH programs, such as PARC, is less demanding on time
and energy; what used to require long lengths of time are abbreviated with a click of a computer
mouse. The choice to apply ACH in identifying a link between DPRK manufactured supernotes
and North Korea’s nuclear arms program was suitable because it aids in minimizing cognitive
biases when generating hypotheses and gathering evidence. However, ACH is an analytical tool
and the end conclusion is determined by the analyst and not solely by the matrix.
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APPENDIX - A: Key Assumption Check – ACH 1
Key Assumption:
E9: DPRK does not have printing talent
Assessment:
The probability that North Korea does not have the skilled work force required to operate
and manage a currency production facility is likely, as the required investment in
developing a skilled-worked is expensive and time consuming. However, history has
proved that North Korea has an older generation of currency printers that is similar, if not
identical, to those of the US Treasury. Although these older presses are probably retired
from service, the operators and managers that serviced them could still cultivate new
printing talent.~POSSIBLE
E11: DPRK needs cash to purchase military arms/technology from rogue nations
It can be determined from the sources found in the literature review that that rogue
nations seek North Korea for military hardware more so than North Korea seeking arms
from rogue nations. North Korean manufactured military arms sell for $100’s millions
annually, leaving the reported amount North Korea spends on procuring nuclear
technology to advance it nuclear mission. Also consider that North Korea may not
necessarily be using cash, but rather barter. Economic sanctions makes dealing with cash
more difficult.~LIKELY, but a transaction using supernotes in exchange for military
material has not yet been reported.
E12: Maintain and Support Juche and Songun policies demands supernote
The policy of military-first and national self-preservation are virtues that are paramount
within North Korean ideology. National ideological maintenance costs money, so as to
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maintain and improve upon social programs and DPRK development.

It must be

understood that the North Korean army, compared to the rest of the world, is
proportionally very large and has the largest special-forces branch in the world. The Kim
desire to maintain its army is very costly, however, a reputation for corruption and greed
sullies Juche and Songun ideologies.~POSSIBLE
E15: Diminished Chongryon Financial Support
Financial support from Chongryon has been shrinking less and less through the years,
mostly due to its shrinking population of ethnic North Korean that never returned after
the Korean War, or even earlier, since the Japanese occupation during WWII. The
revenue generated by this group is not substantial enough to significantly alter the course
of North Korea’s nuclear mission.~NOT LIKELY
E16: Droughts, Floods, and Famine
Supernotes are not being used to deal with droughts, floods, and famine, but it is more
likely that supernotes are collected by corrupt elite before reaching the needy. ~NOT
LIKELY
E17: China is manipulating DPRK to produce supernotes.
China is a close trade partner with North Korea and is implementing economic pressure
upon North Korea to produce supernotes. But this is very unlikely, what is to stop China
from manufacturing supernotes? Furthermore, this claim is unsupported. ~NOT LIKELY
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APPENDIX - B: Is DPRK Printing Supernotes? – ACH Matrix 1

Table A.1 : Is DPRK Printing Supernotes? – ACH Matrix 1.1

Legend:

Part 1/2

CC = very consistent; C = consistent; N = neutral; NA = not applicable; I = inconsistent; II = very inconsistent.
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Table A.2: Is DPRK Printing Supernotes? – ACH Matrix 1.2

Legend:
CC = very consistent; C = consistent; N = neutral; NA = not applicable; I = inconsistent; II = very inconsistent.
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Part 2/2

APPENDIX - C: ACH Inconsistency Score vs Hypothesis, Matrix 1
25

Weighed Inconsistency Score

20

23.7

15

10
10

5
4.8

0
DPRK is NOT Printing Supernotes

DPRK is Printing Supernotes

DPRK has Supernote Deception and
Denial Motive

Hypotheses

Figure A.1: Inconsistencies- Is DPRK Printing Supernotes?
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APPENDIX - D: Is DPRK Printing Supernotes? –Evidence List 1
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APPENDIX - E: Key Assumption Check – ACH 2
Key Assumption:
E4: Less Chongryon Aid
Assessment:
Financial support from Chongryon has been shrinking less and less through the years,
mostly due to its shrinking population of ethnic North Korean that never returned after
the Korean War, or even earlier, since the Japanese occupation during WWII. The
revenue generated by this group is not substantial enough to significantly alter the course
of North Korea’s nuclear mission. However, when considering the bellicose history
between Korea and Japan supernotes combined with its relationship with nuclear arms
makes North Korea project an image of greater power. Furthermore, North Korea loves
sabre-rattling.~LIKELY
E5: Songun and Juche Policies always demands more funding
Supernotes alone is not enough to fulfill a North Korean atomic vision that embraces its
Songun and Juche ideologies, as corrupt, greedy fingers snag much funding. However,
when

introducing

the

element

nuclear

power,

it

proves

to

be

a

game

changer.~PROBABLE
E11: Hurt US Currency Confidence: Reg. & Int'l
Although the prevalence of supernotes compared to the gross amount of US dollars in
international circulation is minuscule, the continued presence of supernotes will affect
regions that are dependent on the US dollar. Furthermore, the cyclical nature in the
management of North Korea’s illicit activities means that more illicit activities will yield
in more illicit activities and probably faster nuclear armament. ~PROBABLE
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E12: DPRK Actively Printing Supernotes
Although there is no proof the North Korea is currently printing supernotes, it is highly
relevant and LIKELY so long as North Korea continues to introduce new nuclear
developments and tests.
E14: ROK Supernote Denial
LIKELY- In any case where South Korean officials downplay the occurrence of
supernotes, it can be assumed that South Korea is attempting to engage in
diplomacy…with this perspective it may be better to manage the situation than solve the
problem.
E16: Basketball diplomacy
UNLIKELY- the implementation of basketball yields no correspondence to supernotes
and it’s financing of North Korea’s nuclear program. In the slight chance that supernotes
could be used in coordination with this evidence would probably be used to pay the
basketball players, such as Dennis Rodman…unsupported assumption.
E17: Increasing size of upper/middle class
UNLIKELY. Not enough supernotes are produced to provide for an economic trickledown effect, however, the top elite class is growing larger, but will not take precedence
over North Korea’s atomic ambition.
E18: Execution of Jang Song Thaek
The execution of Uncle Jang Song Thaek was based on treason and corruption. If Kim
Jung Un's uncle was indeed found to be engaged in participating in illicit activities, his
execution would act as a flashlight focusing attention on DPRK illegal activities.
Furthermore, a public display of authoritarian justice is implying that the Kim regime
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does not tolerate insurrection nor the propogation of illegal funds acquisition. Kim Jung
Un's power-play could be used to better seat himself as the unchallenged leader, not
prevent corruption. Un’s execution of his Uncle is UNLIKELY to have any relation to a
supernote-nuclear link. No supporting information acknowledges that the execution
Thaek has any relationship to the supernote-nuclear arms program link.
E20: Hollywood
Theatrical films are excellent at portraying North Korea as the international villain.
However, Hollywood has no connection with supernotes or North Korea’s nuclear
program other than a sinister portrayal. A Hollywood-supernote link is UNLIKELY.
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APPENDIX - F: Supernotes Financing DPRK's Nuclear Program ACH Matrix 2
Table A.3: Supernotes Financing DPRK’s Nuclear Program – ACH Matrix 2.1

Legend:

Part 1/2

CC = very consistent; C = consistent; N = neutral; NA = not applicable; I = inconsistent; II = very inconsistent.
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Table A.4: Supernotes Financing DPRK’s Nuclear Program – ACH Matrix 2.2

Legend:
CC = very consistent; C = consistent; N = neutral; NA = not applicable; I = inconsistent; II = very inconsistent.
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Part 2/2

APPENDIX - G: ACH Inconsistency Score vs Hypothesis, Matrix 2
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DPRK's Nuclear Program
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DPRK's Nuclear Program
DPRK's Nuclear Program

Hypotheses

Figure A.2: Inconsistencies- Supernotes Financing DPRK’s Nuclear Arms Program
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APPENDIX - H: Supernotes Financing DPRK’s Nuclear Program - Evidence
List 2
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